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THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE  
Adrian Vermeule* 
 The federal constitution contains a set of rules that I will describe as the 
constitutional law of congressional procedure. These are rules that directly regulate the 
internal decisionmaking procedures of Congress;1 absent specific constitutional 
provision, they would be subject to the authority of each House to “determine the Rules 
of its Proceedings.”2 The constitutional law of congressional procedure thus encompasses 
the long catalogue of procedural provisions in Article I, §4–5, which includes rules for 
assembling the legislature, selecting its officers, and disciplining its members; voting and 
quorum rules; rules governing the transparency of deliberation and voting; and a range of 
other provisions. It also encompasses other important rules scattered elsewhere in 
Articles I and II, such as the Origination Clause,3 special quorum rules for supermajority 
voting,4 and the special procedures for overriding a presidential veto.5 But I shall exclude 
questions about the structure and composition of the legislature—questions such as the 
choice between bicameralism and unicameralism, or the standing qualifications for 
federal legislative office. Drawing this boundary around the topic has both 
methodological and substantive justifications. Methodologically, it is impossible to talk 
fruitfully about the design of constitutional rules if everything is up for grabs all at once; 
there must be fixed points from which the analysis may proceed. Substantively, the 
composition and structure of Congress fall outside the Houses’ internal rulemaking 
powers, so they do not bear directly on the Constitution’s choice to prescribe some 
procedural rules while leaving others to legislative discretion. 
 The constitutional law of congressional procedure has rarely been analyzed as an 
integrated body of rules,6 largely because of historical quirks in the relevant sectors of 
political science and constitutional law. Political science has made the crucial point that 
Congress’ internal procedures are at least as important a determinant of policy outcomes 
and of the quality of legislative deliberation as are electoral rules, substantive legislative 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks to Elizabeth Garrett, Jake Gersen, Larry Sager, and 
Lior Strahilevitz for helpful comments, to Eric Truett for excellent research assistance, and to the Russell J. 
Parsons Fund for financial support. Special thanks to Yun Soo Vermeule. 
1 The qualifier serves to exclude provisions that incidentally affect congressional procedure as a byproduct 
of other aims, as when the constitutional right of free speech is interpreted to restrict the scope of 
congressional investigations. See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S., 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
2 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
3 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
4 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
5 U.S. CONST., art I, § 7, cl. 2-3. 
6 Specific topics discussed in the literature include voting rules, especially supermajority rules, see John O. 
McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002). 
There is also a strain of public-law scholarship concerned with “due process of lawmaking,” see, e .g. Hans 
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). This work, however, unfortunately tends 
to entangle itself in questions about how courts should conduct judicial review, and whether such review 
might be used to improve congressional performance. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee and Robert A. 
Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2001). My project here is to move decisively 
away from this court-centered discourse, instead analyzing the subject from the standpoint of constitutional 
design.  
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powers, and other subjects studied exhaustively by constitutional lawyers.7 The central 
tendency in recent political scholarship on Congress, however, has been to assume that 
all legislative procedure is endogenous, subject to alteration by sufficiently determined 
legislative majorities wielding internal rulemaking power.8 Against this picture, I will 
emphasize the rich and varied body of internal legislative rules that the Constitution 
prescribes directly, rather than delegating to future legislatures. The interaction between 
these rules and the endogenously-chosen rules studied by political scientists makes the 
constitutional design of the legislative process an essential topic in politics. Legal 
scholarship, on the other hand, has neglected internal legislative rules altogether, with 
honorable exceptions.9 Here the political scientists’ emphasis on the importance of 
legislative procedure is a valuable corrective, one that I shall adopt and expand. 
So my project is to examine this body of rules as a unified topic that is central to 
the constitutional design of legislative power. The project is neither positive nor radically 
normative, but instead instrumental and prescriptive. I shall ask whether and how the 
Constitution’s rules of congressional procedure might be structured to promote a 
congeries of widely-shared aims: the relevant rules should, among other things, promote 
congressional deliberation that is well-informed and cognitively undistorted, minimize 
the principal-agent problems inherent in legislative representation, and encourage 
technically efficient use of constrained legislative resources, especially time. As we shall 
see, these aims were in large part also the framers’ aims, or at least their professed ones. 
But the means that the framers chose to attain these aims, and the tradeoffs they struck, 
however enlightened or technically impressive at the time, have in some respects come to 
seem obsolete in light of the subsequent two centuries’ worth of theoretical 
developments, experimentation and innovation in other jurisdictions. This is not to say, 
however, that the framers’ views are irrelevant to the instrumental project of 
                                                 
7  See Gary W. Cox, On the Effects of Legislative Rules, in Gerhard Loewenberg et al., LEGISLATURES: 
COMAPRATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES 251-63 (2002). 
8 See, e.g., David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION-COST POLITICS 
APPROACH TO POLICYMAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 164 (1999) (treating “legislative organization” 
and “the types of procedures invoked in passing legislation” as products of “collective choice”); Keith 
Krehbiel, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 77-79 (1992) (treating the legislature’s 
membership as exogenously fixed, but treating “organizational design” as an endogenous product of 
legislative choice);  Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; 
or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
132 (1988) (treating “legislative institutions” as endogenous products of legislators’ goals and transaction 
costs).  For important exceptions, see, e.g., Cox, supra note ---, at 248-49 (distinguishing rules exogenously 
fixed by the Constitution from endogenous rule subject to congressional alteration); John Ferejohn, 
Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, DEMOCRACY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin eds 
(1999) (analyzing the Journal Clause in light of principal-agent models); infra note --- (formal models of 
the Origination Clause).  A great deal of formal modeling in political science takes various legislative 
procedures as exogenously fixed, but this is strictly a methodological move that reduces the scope of the 
relevant models in the interests of mathematical tractability. Such work typically pays no attention to the 
difference between (1) modeling stipulations that particular procedural rules are exogenously fixed and (2) 
fixation by virtue of constitutional command. 
9 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 
35 HARV. J. LEGIS. 387 (1998). For links between legislative procedure and congressional constitutional 
interpretation, see Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 
50 DUKE L.J. 1277 (2001). 
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constitutional design and reform; far from it. If we wish to evaluate and improve the 
constitutional design in this area or any other, the ideas, arguments and pragmatic 
solutions that our own constitutional designers developed are a rich source of useful 
information, one that I will draw upon throughout. 
I shall also draw upon two bodies of material that are typically neglected in 
modern treatments. The first is a rich utilitarian tradition of theorizing about the optimal 
design of legislative procedures, especially Bentham’s great monograph.10 The second is 
comparative constitutional law, including state and foreign constitutions that contain a 
wealth of design possibilities and ingenious rules for minimizing legislative pathologies. 
To be sure, these sources of information and instrumental analysis often do not generate 
sharp deductive arguments with confident conclusions. There are too many design 
possibilities, too many margins on which tradeoffs must be made, and the fog of 
empirical uncertainty is too thick. The payoff, rather, is a horizontal study that links 
related design problems, analyzes their interaction, and supports plausible 
recommendations for improvement. 
Part I surveys the methodological problems that constitutional framers designing 
legislative procedures must confront. One key problem is whether rules on particular 
subjects should be promulgated in the Constitution itself, or should instead be committed 
to the discretion of future congresses through a general grant of rulemaking power. 
Constitutional framers may, and our framers did, make this decision on any of several 
different grounds, including the idea that the Constitution should provide rules on 
subjects that a legislature is logically incapable of deciding for itself (such as the time of 
its first assembling); the more pragmatic idea that the framers should choose the rules on 
subjects as to which they possess a comparative advantage, cognitive or motivational, 
over later legislators; and, most pragmatic of all, the need to ensure that the proposed 
Constitution would be politically acceptable to ratifiers and the people. Another problem 
is the opposite of the preceding one: given a decision to proceed through constitutional 
rules rather than by delegation to future legislatures, and given the constraints of severely 
limited time, information, and political capital under which constitutional framers 
operate, how should the framers choose the content of the rules? Here a major problem is 
whether framers should simply copy or adopt provisions from the constitutions of other 
jurisdictions, without independent inquiry into the provisions’ underlying mechanisms 
and political rationales, or should instead attempt a thoroughly independent inquiry into 
optimal design. Both of these polar views, as well as intermediate views of greater or 
lesser coherence, were represented at the federal constitutional convention. 
Part II turns from method to substance. After introducing the major analytic 
themes, I shall consider in turn the timing of congressional sessions, the admission and 
expulsion of legislators, the selection of legislative officers, voting and quorum rules, the 
publicity or transparency of legislative deliberation and voting, the rule barring the 
Senate from originating revenue bills, and the question whether Congress may enact 
binding statutes that prescribe internal rules for the two Houses taken separately. I will 
also consider provisions that are surprisingly absent from the federal constitution—rules 
                                                 
10 Jeremy Bentham, POLITICAL TACTICS, Michael James, Cyprian Blamires, and Catherine Pease-Watkin 
eds. (1999). 
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of legislative procedure that appear in state and foreign constitutions, and whose absence 
from our own itself poses interesting puzzles. Examples are rules requiring three readings 
before a bill may be enacted, and rules that bar the introduction or enactment of bills at 
the close of the legislative session. Throughout Part II, the aim is to identify design 
defects, to evaluate valuable alternatives and innovations found in state and foreign 
constitutions, and to propose interpretive choices or constitutional reforms that might 
improve the constitutional law of congressional procedure. 
I. DESIGNING CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES 
 In this Part I will examine the design of constitutional rules of legislative 
procedure, with a view to the methodological problems that the framers encountered and 
debated. In I.A. the question is why any rules of congressional procedure should be 
constitutionalized; why not simply leave all internal procedures to the discretion of future 
legislatures? I.B. poses the next question: given a decision to constitutionalize a rule or 
set of rules on a given subject, how should constitutional framers choose the content of 
those rules—by imitation of other constitutions, by independent ratiocination about 
optimal design, or by some mix of these strategies?   
A. Why Constitutionalize Congressional Procedure? 
 An initial puzzle is why any rules of congressional procedure should be 
constitutionalized. Constitutions almost invariably grant some measure of discretionary 
power over internal rules to the legislatures created by the constitution. The federal 
constitution’s Rules of Proceedings Clause,11 which gives each House separately the 
power to enact internal procedural rules,12 is, in effect, a delegation of rule-designing 
authority from constitutional framers in the initial period to legislators at subsequent 
periods. Given the baseline established by this constitutional delegation, the puzzle is 
why framers might want to select some rules to be elevated to a higher status in the legal 
hierarchy, and so made immune from alteration by ordinary legislative rulemaking. 
 At some risk of false precision, we can identify three (classes of) reasons to 
constitutionalize rules of legislative procedure. First, some procedural rules are logically 
impossible for a future legislature to create, at least as an initial matter; consider the 
question of where and when the legislature shall initially convene, a question that the 
legislature could not resolve without convening. Constitutionalizing such rules can 
eliminate the need for the future legislature to pull itself up by its own bootstraps13 and 
resolves coordination problems. Second, there are rules that a future legislature has the 
capacity to create, but as to which the framers have, or believe themselves to have, a 
comparative advantage over the future legislators who would otherwise choose the rule; 
the framers’ (perceived) comparative advantage might stem from superior information, 
cognition or motivation. Finally, constitutionalizing some rules of legislative procedure 
may for political reasons improve the new constitution’s chances of ratification, by 
                                                 
11 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
12 On the question whether a statute can override the internal rules of each house, see infra II.G. 
13 This is an idea of Jon Elster’s, developed from his analysis of constitutional conventions. See Jon Elster, 
Constitutional Bootstrapping in Paris and Philadelphia, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 549 (1993). My argument is 
that there is a parallel problem for the legislatures created by the constitutional convention. 
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accommodating the preferences of the ratifying legislatures or conventions. It is tempting 
to think that this reason is in a sense disreputable compared the first two, but the question 
whether framers should consider or ignore the political acceptability of their proposals 
turns out to be complicated; it is not at all clear that downstream ratifiers of the framers’ 
proposed constitution are better off if framers make no effort to anticipate the ratifiers’ 
political preferences. 
Bootstrapping and coordination problems. Institutions are systems of rules. 
Where, as is often the case, an institution also possesses the second-order authority to 
make rules governing its own action, the question arises by what rules those second-order 
rules will themselves be determined. If the initial question, for example, is whether the 
institution’s members will proceed by simple majority vote, an infinite regress threatens: 
is the first-order decision itself to be made by majority vote, or under some other voting 
rule? And what voting rule is to be used to make the second-order decision? Absent some 
higher source of law that blocks the regress, the conceptual problem is insoluble. 
More precisely, the conceptual problem is insoluble in conceptual terms, but there 
are crudely pragmatic solutions. Faced with a regress problem, one expedient is for 
institutions to simply bootstrap themselves into existence. An example is the Philadelphia 
convention itself: because no outside institution had specified the voting rules the 
delegates would use, the delegates simply decided to proceed by simple majority vote (of 
state delegations, not of individuals). No delegate is on record as opposing this decision, 
probably because voting by simple majorities was standard practice in Parliament and 
contemporaneous state legislatures; the framers’ decision to mandate supermajority rules 
in many settings in the new Constitution was, in the late 18th century, innovative 
constitutional design. In this example, bootstrapping succeeded because the underlying 
decision was not itself contentious.14 Although the convention’s decision lacked coherent 
conceptual foundations, in fine pragmatic style the decision worked even without 
coherent foundations.  
Bootstrapping of this sort, however, can only work when the members of the 
institution are already assembled. In addition to the infinite regress problem, a new 
institution may also face a coordination problem in convening at all. Consider the 
question when the first congress elected under the new federal constitution should 
convene—a decision that the new Congress itself could not possibly make. A pragmatic 
solution to this sort of problem is for an institution under the previous, outgoing 
constitution to specify a focal point on which the new legislature can co-ordinate. Thus 
the outgoing Confederation Congress specified that the new Congress would meet on 
March 4, 1789—a decision of dubious legality, given that the Confederation Congress 
lacked any obvious authority to make it, but also a decision that went unquestioned in 
practice. 
                                                 
14 The larger point is just that internal rules for deliberative bodies (constitutional conventions or 
legislatures) are never chosen in an historical and institutional vacuum. They are always chosen against the 
background, not only of exogenous constraints (constitutional or political), but also of previous rules, 
traditions and practices. For an argument to this effect in the congressional setting, see S.A. Binder, 
Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress (1997).  
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So regress problems and coordination problems are not fatal in practical terms. 
This does not mean, however, that constitutional framers should ignore them. That an 
institution has bootstrapped itself into existence, either in whole or in part, may provide 
future opponents or critics with grounds to question the institution’s legitimacy. So 
constitutional framers may wish to provide rules that obviate the need for new 
legislatures, convened under the new constitution, to bootstrap rules into place. Likewise, 
constitutional framers may easily resolve coordination problems by supplying 
constitutionally-established focal points, which the new legislature may alter once the 
machinery of lawmaking is up and running. 
These concerns were much in evidence at the Philadelphia convention; in 
particular, they animated the Convention’s decision to adopt the provision that “The 
Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the 
first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.”15 One 
coordination problem here involves the timing of the first meeting of the new Congress. 
As John Randolph put it, “some precise time must be fixed, until the Legislature shall 
make provision.”16 A second and distinct coordination problem involved the question 
whether the Congress should meet at all in any given year. Unlike the first problem, this 
question applied not only to the initial meeting of the new Congress but to every 
subsequent meeting, because some of the convention delegates suggested that the 
legislature could meet episodically, only when the public business required it. A political 
line of response to this argument was that regular meetings of the legislature should be 
mandated to provide a check on the executive branch.17 A different, and devastating, 
response was given by Oliver Ellsworth: “The Legislature will not know until they are 
met whether the public interest required their meeting or not.”18  
The Convention, however, failed to anticipate other bootstrapping and 
coordination problems that afflicted the First Congress. One example involved the initial 
formation of a legislative quorum. Article I provides that “a Majority of each [House] 
shall constitute a Quorum to do business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to 
day, and may be authorized [i.e. by the rules of either House] to compel the Attendance 
of absent Members . . . .”19 The second clause was inserted to ensure that the absence of a 
quorum would not prevent either House from compelling the attendance of absentees. 
But the framers failed to anticipate that the initial convening of Congress might fail for 
lack of a quorum, as in fact it did in both the House and Senate. In those circumstances 
the provision for compelling absentees could not be invoked, since neither House had 
ever met to provide compulsion authority to a number smaller than the required quorum. 
In the event the House soon attained a quorum, but the Senate limped along, sending 
                                                 
15 The date specified in this provision has been superseded by the 20th Amendment, which provides that 
“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d 
day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.” U.S. CONST. Amdt. XX. 
16 2 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION, Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds. 283 (1985). The date 
supplied in Article I would have fallen in December 1789, thus contradicting the date (March 4, 1789) 
supplied by the Confederation Congress -- another reason to question the legality of the latter provision. 
17 2 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION, supra note --- at 283. 
18 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, Max Farrand ed. 198 (1966). 
19 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5. 
Congressional Procedure 7 
 
stern but toothless letters to absent members, until it finally convened on April 6, 1789, 
over a month after the assembly date. 
Another, far more consequential example is the one with which we began: the 
framers failed clearly to specify the voting rules that would govern the new legislature. 
Although the framers specified supermajority rules to govern particular decisions, they 
failed to specify whether simple majority voting was a mandatory default rule in areas not 
governed by a supermajority provision, or instead whether the internal rules of each 
House may require supermajorities for particular decisions. In the latter case, the infinite 
regress problem reappears: why should the decision to institute a supermajority 
requirement in a particular area not itself be required to be made by supermajority? The 
Congress, however, like the Convention before it, has ignored the conceptual conundrum 
by assuming that simple majority voting is always the default setting, even for rules 
creating supermajority requirements. 
Comparative advantage. Another ground for constitutionalizing rules of 
congressional procedure is that constitutional framers have some form of comparative 
advantage over later legislators in designing those rules. The framers’ comparative 
advantage might take any of several forms: informational, cognitive, or motivational. The 
framers, that is, might possess superior information relevant to the design problem, might 
enjoy freedom from various cognitive quirks or disabilities that afflict the work of later 
legislators, or might act from public-spirited reasons where later legislators will act on the 
basis of rational self-interest or irrational passions.  
For two reasons, however, the possibility that framers will possess informational 
advantages over later legislators seems quite implausible. The first reason is Bentham’s 
view that later generations always possess an informational advantage over earlier ones,20 
simply by virtue of knowing what has transpired since the earlier generation left the 
scene. Conversely, a stock theme of constitutional choice is that framers act behind a 
“veil of ignorance,” more precisely a veil of uncertainty, that forces them to act 
impartially.21 The cost of this relative impartiality, though, is that the framers act in 
ignorance of post-enactment developments that might provide useful information in the 
choice of legislative procedures.22 The second reason is the relatively larger size of later 
Congresses as compared to the Convention. As Madison argued, increasing the number 
of legislators increases the legislature’s stock of political information.23 This second 
reason is specific to the American experience; it does not hold where, as in some nations, 
the constituent assembly that designs the constitution also functions as an ordinary 
legislature under the constitution. 
                                                 
20 Jeremy Bentham, HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL FALLACIES, Harold A. Larrabee, ed. (1962). 
21 Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399 (2001). 
22 On the general tradeoff between information and impartiality, see Saul Levmore, Efficiency and 
Conspiracy: Conflicts of Interest, Anti-Nepotism Rules, and Separation Strategies, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2099 (1998). On the connections between partisan activity and legislative procedure, see Elizabeth Garrett, 
The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-In-Government, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702 
(2000). 
23 The Federalist Papers, No. 55. 
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Perhaps for these reasons, no one at the Philadelphia convention suggested that 
the framers’ information would be superior to that of later Congresses. At most they 
suggested that the framers’ information was equally good, and then only with respect to 
the sort of coordinating rules that can equally well be settled one way or the other, so 
long as they are settled. Thus Oliver Ellsworth argued that the Convention might as well 
fix the date on which the Congress should annually convene, because “the Convention 
could judge of it as well as the legislature.”24 In such cases, the whole point is that the 
content of the rule is secondary to the sheer coordination benefit of choosing a rule, so 
that the informational advantage of later legislators is irrelevant to the design problem. 
 The framers did frequently suggest, however, that they possessed cognitive and 
motivational advantages over later legislators. In the contemporary terminology the 
framers assumed that future legislators would act on the basis of “interests” and 
“passions” that would skew their judgment of the public good or cause them knowingly 
to act against the public good for private benefit. And these cognitive and motivational 
deficiencies would be exacerbated by legislators’ tendency to clump into “factions”. An 
example involves the question whether future legislators should be allowed to expel by a 
simple majority or only by a supermajority. Madison argued for the latter position on the 
ground that “the right of expulsion was too important to be exercised by a bare majority 
of a quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused.”25 Gouvernor 
Morris opposed this, although with an argument that shared Madison’s premise: “This 
power [of expulsion] may be safely trusted to a majority. To require more may produce 
abuses on the side of the minority. A few men from factious motives may keep in a 
member who ought to be expelled.”26 The disagreement here is over the expected 
frequency and gravity of false positives (expulsion of a member who should not be 
expelled) and false negatives (the failure to expel a member who should be expelled). 
Madison’s supermajority position seeks to minimize false positives, while Morris’ 
position in favor of a simple majority requirement seeks to minimize false negatives. 
Both views, however, share the assumption that the respective errors will occur because 
legislators act on private-regarding or factional motivations. 
 The example is typical of the debates in an important respect. The convention 
participants rarely questioned the assumption of comparative cognitive and motivational 
advantage. Rather, the most frequently heard grounds for opposing the 
constitutionalization of legislative procedures were that the collateral costs of some 
proposed safeguard would outweigh the benefits, or that other institutional structures and 
procedures that the framers had adopted rendered unnecessary the additional safeguard of 
constitutionalizing legislative procedures. Gouvernor Morris’ argument above is an 
example of the former claim. 
An important example of the latter claim involved the debates over the Journal 
Clause. Many participants desired to constitutionalize some version of a requirement that 
Congress publicize its deliberations and votes. Although the framers were sensitive to the 
potential for transparency to distort deliberation—the convention itself deliberated and 
                                                 
24 2 Kurland, supra note --- at 283. 
25 2 Farrand, supra note --- at 254. 
26 Id. 
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voted secretly, partly in order to allow participants to change their minds without 
incurring a reputational penalty in the nation at large27—many delegates believed that 
future legislators could not be trusted to weigh the costs and benefits of transparency in 
public-regarding fashion.28 As George Mason summarized the point (at the Virginia 
ratifying convention, although similar arguments were made at Philadelphia), “[the 
legislators] may conceal what they please. Instead of giving information, they will 
produce suspicion. You cannot discover the advocates of their iniquitous acts.”29 
Against this view, however, was the claim that regular elections would force 
legislators to publicize their actions. As Ellsworth put it, “The Legislature will not fail to 
publish their proceedings from time to time—The people will not fail to call for it if it 
should be improperly omitted.”30 The precise electoral mechanism that Ellsworth 
envisioned here is unclear. One possibility is that voters demand transparency because it 
reduces the costs of monitoring their elected agents. Legislators competing against each 
other and against potential candidates for the voters’ confidence might be responsive to 
that demand even if each legislator would prefer less transparency than voters would. 
Here secrecy might be viewed, from the standpoint of the whole group of legislators, as 
an unattainable public good. If all legislative action were secret, no particular legislator 
could be blamed for the practice. But if each legislator has the option to disclose 
deliberations or votes, and if such disclosures are verifiable when made, then legislators 
may defect from the cooperative behavior of secrecy-maintenance in order to better their 
position vis-à-vis other legislators or potential challengers, even if all legislators would 
be better off with secrecy. 
To be sure, this mechanism assumes that voters care about transparency. Voters 
might simply use decision rules that are entirely insensitive to legislative procedures. 
Consider the idea that voters vote retrospectively in a simpleminded fashion, asking 
whether or not their personal economic position is better (in absolute or relative terms) at 
the time of election than it was at the time of the previous election.31 We will see below, 
however, that a principal-agent model, representing legislators as agents who offer ever-
greater transparency to compete for the favor of voter-principals, captures useful truths 
about both the Journal Clause and about subsequent developments in congressional 
procedure.32 Whatever the details of the implicit model, however, Ellsworth’s argument 
supposes that constitutionalizing a transparency requirement is unnecessary, given that 
the institutional safeguard of regular elections is already in place. 
Political acceptability. A final ground for constitutionalizing procedural rules was 
often invoked in the convention debates: the idea that some rules were indispensable to 
ensuring that the proposed constitution would be politically acceptable to the ratifiers, or 
to the people generally. This theme was especially prominent in the debates over the 
                                                 
27 See infra note --- 
28 2 Kurland, supra note --- at 290-91. 
29 2 Kurland, supra note --- at 293. 
30 2 Farrand, supra note --- at 260. 
31 For an overview of the large literature on retrospective voting, see D. Roderick Kiewiet; Douglas 
Rivers, A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting,, 6 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 369 (1984). 
32 See Ferejohn, supra note ---  
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Journal Clause and the Origination Clause. As to the former, James Wilson argued that, 
apart from the merits of the Clause, “as this is a clause in the existing [articles of] 
confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform with a 
pretext by which weak & suspicious minds may be easily mislead.”33 As to the latter, 
Gerry argued that the people “will not agree that any but their immediate representatives 
[i.e. in the House of Representatives] shall meddle with their purses. In short the 
acceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from originating 
Money bills.”34 This external political constraint should be distinguished from a different 
political constraint internal to the convention: the need to ensure that the proposed draft 
was politically acceptable to a majority of the state delegations. Obviously there are close 
linkages between the two constraints, because delegates might, and frequently did, shape 
their internal positions by anticipating the reactions and preferences of downstream 
ratifiers. 
A tempting reaction to the external constraint is that it is undesirable for 
constitutional framers to consider the political preferences of downstream ratifiers. After 
all, if the framers’ politics-independent view of optimal design is correct, then to modify 
that design on political grounds is to propose a suboptimal constitution. Many of the 
framers saw their own political predictions in this light; they believed that the ratifiers’ 
or, especially, the people’s political preferences derived from irrational fears of 
aristocratic conspiracy, fears that opponents of the new constitution could exploit. This is 
the thrust of Wilson’s reference to “weak & suspicious minds [who] may be easily 
mislead,”35 and of John Dickinson’s argument, in the debates over the Origination 
Clause, that 
all the prejudices of the people would be offended by refusing this exclusive 
privilege to the [House of Representatives] and these prejudices [should] 
never be disregarded by us when no essential purpose was to be served. 
When this plan goes forth, it will be attacked by the popular leaders. 
Aristocracy will be the watchword; the Shibboleth among its adversaries.36  
Dickinson’s argument, like Wilson’s, assumes that the framers possess privileged 
insight into optimal constitutional design. The argument that the framers should ignore 
political considerations is not, however, dependent upon this assumption. Whether or not 
the framers’ independent view of optimal design is correct, the ratifiers might believe that 
the best division of labor is for the framers to leave all political considerations to the 
ratifiers themselves, just as a legislator might desire staff technocrats to consider only 
matters of optimal policy design, leaving considerations of political acceptability to the 
expertise of professional politicians. This point is all the stronger if ratifiers’ political 
preferences can themselves be shaped, at least in part, by the framers’ proposals. In that 
case, the framers’ attempt to anticipate the ratifiers’ preferences is an unnecessary 
enterprise, for those preferences will be, in whole or in part, a product of the framers’ 
actions, rather than a constraint on their actions. 
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Yet there are also public-spirited reasons for constitutional framers to consider 
politics, and even for ratifiers to consider themselves better off if framers do so. The 
circumstances under which constitution-making typically occurs entail that the framers’ 
relationship to ratifiers is fundamentally unlike the relationship of policy analysts to 
decisionmakers. Constitutional framing typically occurs under conditions of perceived 
political crisis, given the breakdown of the old constitutional order, and under a 
constraint of urgency, given the need to coordinate upon a new constitutional order. If 
framing and ratification must be completed under severe time constraints, ratifiers will be 
better off if framers attempt to anticipate their political preferences. The option to reject 
an initial, politically insensitive proposal and to send the framers back to the drawing 
board will often be practically infeasible. In these circumstances ratifiers will be worse 
off if they are constrained to accept a proposal that is marginally better than total failure 
of the constitution-making process, yet worse than any of the potential designs that take 
their preferences into account. 
B. Reason or Experience? 
Given a decision to constitutionalize rules of legislative procedure, another 
critical methodological question for constitutional designers is whether to adopt rules 
from other jurisdictions without independent inquiry into their institutional and political 
rationales, or instead to attempt a thoroughly independent assessment of optimal design, 
including sophisticated predictions about the interaction effects between provisions. In 
the framers’ philosophical argot, this was the opposition between “reason” and 
“experience”: the defining difference turns on whether the proponent who urges adoption 
of a particular rule conducts a full independent inquiry into the institutional and political 
mechanisms that cause the rule to produce the hoped-for effects, or instead eschews a full 
understanding of the relevant political forces. The latter approach amounts to a deliberate 
policy of adoption; the only question the adopter asks is whether the rule at issue has 
proven “workable,” in some roughly pragmatic sense, in the polity from whose 
constitution it is to be adopted. 
The convention debates over provide the Origination Clause provide many 
examples of both approaches, because the principal argument for the clause was that the 
delegates should imitate the firm rule of English law that money bills could only be 
originated in the House of Commons. As for ambitiously rationalist constitutional design, 
an example is Madison’s initial sally against adopting the clause: 
Mr. Madison observed that the Commentators on the [British constitution] 
had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the [House of Lords] in 
money bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case 
before us. The senate would be the representatives of the people as well as 
the 1st branch [the House of Representatives]. If they [should] have any 
dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail on some member of 
the latter to originate the bill they wished to be passed.37 
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By contrast, a particularly pure example of the experiential, antirationalist stance is John 
Dickinson’s famous speech urging the Philadelphia delegates to adopt the clause: 
Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us. It was not 
Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism of the English 
Constitution. It was not Reason that discovered or ever could have 
discovered the odd & in the eye of those who are governed by reason, the 
absurd mode of trial by Jury. Accidents probably produced these 
discoveries, and experience has give[n] a sanction to them. This then is our 
guide. And has not experience verified the utility of restraining money bills 
to the immediate representatives of the people. Whence the effect may have 
proceeded he could not say; whether from the respect with which this 
privilege inspired the other branches of Govt. to the H[ouse] of Commons, 
or from the turn of thinking it gave to the people at large with regard to their 
rights, but the effect was visible and could not be doubted.38 
The choice between independent inquiry (“reason”) and adoption (“experience”) 
superficially resembles the standard distinction, in the literature on comparative 
constitutionalism, between interjurisdictional borrowing or copying, on the one hand, and 
innovation, on the other. The two distinctions, however, are merely overlapping, not 
coterminous. The rationalist and optimizing constitutional designer may “borrow” from 
other jurisdictions in the sense that he consults other jurisdictions’ constitutions to obtain 
ideas and possibilities; the designer then treats those ideas as candidate options within the 
design space, to be assessed against other candidates in the optimizing calculus. Note also 
that adoption may draw upon unwritten as well as written constitutions, so long as the 
content of unwritten practices is sufficiently clear. Many American framers urged 
adoption of the unwritten practices of English constitutionalism, as in Dickinson’s 
argument. It was also true, contrary to a common assumption, that the framers had many 
written constitutions on which to draw. Circulating compilations of written state 
constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, and important treaties provided models on 
which the framers drew, as did the history of the classical and early modern European 
polities. 
What then is the best strategy for constitutional framers? At first blush, the 
circumstances of constitution-making would seem to entail that framers should mix 
imitation and innovation in eclectic proportions, not susceptible to general theorizing or 
extreme solutions in either direction. Constitutions, as we have seen, are typically 
designed under conditions of political crisis and urgency. To these we may add two 
factors: that the large-scale and long-term consequences of the choice of constitutional 
rules are exceedingly difficult to predict,39 and that constitutional framers are properly 
risk-averse, designing institutions to minimize the downside risks of political and social 
disasters rather than to maximize the upside gain from political association.40 These 
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factors militate in favor of imitation. Militating in favor of innovation, however, is the 
typical idea that provisions or rules adopted from other jurisdictions will prove 
maladapted to the local circumstances of the adopting jurisdiction. At the convention, 
Rutlidge criticized the origination clauses in the state constitutions as “put in through a 
blind adherence to the British model. If the work was to be done over now, they would be 
omitted.”41 A complementary claim is that adapted provisions will fail to take root; only 
constitutions or provisions that are in some sense organic or indigenous will prove stable 
in the long term. 
The optimum, then, would seem to be the banality that constitutional framers 
should imitate where appropriate to local circumstances. We may add a modicum of 
content to this conclusion in two ways. First, where many jurisdictions have converged 
on similar constitutional design(s), imitation is more prudent and less costly than 
innovation. The consensus across jurisdictions suggests that different polities have 
converged on a real constitutional optimum, one dictated by real institutional forces.42 
Although in principle the consensus might also rest simply on an opinion cascade or 
herding effect,43 in which a suboptimal rule is widely adopted simply because 
jurisdictions lacking information imitate others whom they (erroneously) take to have 
better insight, the cascade may, of course, also produce convergence on the optimal rule, 
so the risks of deviating from a widespread consensus are generally higher than the risks 
of copying it. Second, framers should distinguish between rules whose principal virtue is 
settlement of a question that can equally well be settled one way or the other, on the one 
hand, and rules whose content is independently significant, on the other. The former are 
better candidates for adoption, since the bare inquiry into stability or workability answers 
the only question that needs to be asked about provisions whose content is of secondary 
importance. 
Even with these supplemental points, it is very hard to say anything in the abstract 
about the optimal mix of rationalist design versus adoption. Against this theoretically 
pessimistic conclusion, however, is an important dynamic that renders the mixed 
approach unstable, thereby pressing constitutional framers towards the extremes of global 
imitation or global innovation. An illustration of this dynamic appears in the debates over 
the Origination Clause. Gouvernor Morris argued that “We should either take the British 
Constitution altogether or make one for ourselves.”44 As a normative matter, as we have 
seen, Morris’ position seems questionable. Yet we may reinterpret Morris’ point as a 
positive claim about the choices available to constitutional designers: for two reasons, the 
intermediate position that mixes reason with experience, independent evaluation with 
                                                                                                                                                 
dimensions, not an effort designed to achieve the best that government can offer. It is, rather, an attempt to 
avoid the worst, an attempt keyed to the peculiar pathologies that have been shown to be likely to afflict 
American democracy”).  
41 2 Farrand, supra note --- at 279. 
42 See generally Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and 
Modern Tort Law, 61 TULANE L. REV. 235 (1986). 
43 For an overview of information cascades and rational herding, see generally Abhijit V. Banerjee, A 
Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. Econ. 797 (1992); Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirchleifer, & 
Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational, Cascades, 100 J. 
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44 1 Farrand, supra note --- at 545. 
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adoption, may prove infeasible. First, where the designers may draw upon the experience 
of multiple jurisdictions whose provisions on similar topics conflict with one another, the 
appeal to experience is indeterminate; some reason, other than workability, must be given 
for adopting one or the other approach. Second, to propose partial modifications of other 
jurisdictions’ rules on rationalist grounds is an incoherent stance: if the designer can 
describe and predict the political mechanisms that make the modification valuable, 
including the interaction effects of the modification with the unmodified rules and with 
other provisions, then the designer necessarily possesses the capacity to conduct an 
independent evaluation of the unmodified provisions as well. 
An example of the instability of the mixed approach is the very setting in which 
Morris’ argument was made. The provocation was an important internal tension in 
Dickinson’s position. The English practice was that money bills could originate only in 
the Commons and could not be amended by the Lords. Of the eight states that adopted 
origination restrictions, however, most allowed the nonoriginating branch to amend 
bills.45 “This he [Dickinson] thought it would be proper for us to do.”46 The first problem 
here is that of indeterminacy: why should the modified state provisions on origination 
allowing amendments, rather than the unmodified package of English practices that 
barred amendment, provide the reference for the argument from experience? The second 
problem is the incoherence of partial modification: if the effects of conferring the power 
of amendment upon the upper branch can be assessed on nonexperiential grounds, why 
cannot the baseline origination provision be assessed on the same grounds? On this view, 
the normatively attractive approach is to mix reason and experience in a particularistic 
manner guided by situation-sense, yet the instability of that intermediate stance will tend 
to push constitutional framers to the extremes of wholesale redesign or wholesale 
imitation. It is unclear, in the abstract, how these opposing tendencies will net out in 
particular constitution-making episodes, but the federal convention in the end moved well 
towards the extreme of wholesale redesign. Compared to the existing models in England 
and the states, the federal constitution is strikingly original in important respects, most 
famously in the division of powers between federal and state governments and in the 
complex rules that parcel lawmaking power between a bicameral legislature and an 
independently-elected executive. 
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE  
 Part I examined the methodological problems facing the framers in deciding 
whether to constitutionalize rules of congressional procedure and in choosing the content 
of the relevant rules. This Part examines the substance of the rules that the framers 
adopted, as well as rules that they might have adopted but did not, where the failure to do 
so itself illuminates the constitutional-design questions. II.A. outlines the scope and limits 
of the enterprise, while II.B. introduces a few major substantive themes of the analysis. 
II.C. examines, in turn, the rules that determine when and by whom the Congress may be 
convened or adjourned; issues of membership in the legislature, including the procedures 
for disqualifying or expelling a (purported) member; the legislature’s choice of officers; 
the quorum rules that accompany simple majority voting and supermajority voting; the 
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transparency or secrecy of legislative deliberation and voting; the Origination Clause; and 
joint cameral rulemaking. Finally, I will supplement the analysis by considering missing 
provisions—rules of legislative procedure that might well have been constitutionalized, 
but were not. Examples include requirements that each bill address only a single subject, 
and that bills be brought up for reading or debate three times before a final vote can be 
taken; these and other rules are embodied in various state and foreign constitutions.  
A. Preliminaries 
My ambition in this Part is to examine the constitutional law of congressional 
procedure from the prescriptive standpoint of constitutional design. I will not ask positive 
questions about the genesis of the relevant constitutional rules in the hurly-burly 
bargaining of the convention. Nor will I discuss their positive effects, except insofar as 
anticipation of those effects would be relevant to the project of sound constitutional 
design. The prescriptive approach will, however, have useful implications for 
constitutional interpretation, to the extent that the prevailing theory of interpretation 
licenses interpreters to fill gaps and ambiguities in the constitutional text with 
normatively sensible rules. 
Constitutional design presupposes some first-order account that specifies what the 
aims of design are, what will count as an instrumentally successful design. Yet such 
accounts are the province of political theory, not of consequentialist analysis. Here I will 
simply stipulate to a set of widely-shared criteria for evaluating congressional 
performance, criteria stated in rough form and at a relatively low level of abstraction. 
Congressional procedure should, among other aims, work to accomplish all of the 
following:  
Minimize principal-agent problems inherent in legislative representation. 
Legislators are agents for their constituents. This need not imply that legislators should 
view themselves as mouthpieces for constituent preferences, should adopt the opposing, 
Burkean view that legislators are to exercise independent judgment about the common 
good, or should adopt some other view entirely. On any of these conceptions, legislator-
agents are charged with tasks by citizen-principals, and the ever-present risk is that the 
agents will divert resources from public tasks to private gain. Time is a resource, so an 
important form of diversion is shirking, in which legislators consume leisure rather than 
attending to public business. An important aim of legislative procedure is to minimize the 
social costs of legislators’ diversion and shirking, including the costs incurred to prevent 
those problems. 47 
Contribute to well-informed and cognitively undistorted deliberation about 
policy. Legislatures are multi-member policymaking bodies (where policymaking 
includes the decision to delegate policymaking to others). In general, the performance of 
such bodies is a function of the information they possess and of the quality of their 
deliberations. Deliberation may, in turn, be distorted by a range of decisionmaking 
pathologies, including group polarization, rational and irrational herding behavior, 
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conformity and preference falsification, and other mechanisms.48 Legislative procedure 
should encourage representatives to reveal the private information they hold while 
dampening deliberative pathologies.49 
Make technically efficient use of legislative resources. Congress, like other 
legislatures, operates under severe resource constraints. Perhaps the most important of 
these resources is time. The legislative agenda is extremely compressed, and no single 
legislator can spend enough time on policy analysis to comprehend more than a small 
fraction of the issues the legislature takes up. Modern legislatures have accordingly 
evolved committee systems, in part to promote a division of labor and specialization in 
the production of information and policies. In a similar vein, legislative procedure should, 
among its other aims, help to ensure that Congress uses scarce resources in the most 
efficient possible manner. Holding constant the quality and quantity of congressional 
output, attaining that output at unnecessarily high social cost is a pure loss.  
Stipulating to a set of widely-shared aims in this fashion is a common procedure 
in the institutional-design literature, and for good reasons. First, the evaluative criteria I 
have posited are widely shared, in part, because they are the common denominator of the 
rival camps of political theory. Theoretical approaches may, from diverse starting-points, 
converge to an “overlapping consensus”50 or “incompletely-theorized agreement”51 on 
mid-level institutional ideas, for example the idea that legislative representatives should 
be deterred from shirking or from diverting public resources for private gain. Second—
this point is merely the converse of the first—disagreements at the level of high theory 
often fail to cut between concrete institutional-design choices.52 To prefigure a later 
example, the decision whether or not to require a minimum quorum for legislative 
business does not turn critically on rival conceptions of democracy, or of good 
legislation. Third, institutional arrangements of one sort or another must be devised and 
evaluated even if political theory has not (yet) achieved consensus on the aims of 
constitutionalism, and perhaps will never do so. “If we put off the questions of 
institutional design until the higher-order questions are settled, we will get to them at the 
time of Godot’s arrival. In the meantime, however, life goes on and we need grounds for 
preferring some institutional arrangements over others.”53 Finally, and most 
pragmatically, discussing institutional design with only a rough picture of the underlying 
aims is a sensible division of academic labor. Theory specialists may usefully focus on 
principles, but that is not my project here. 
As we will see, the difficult enterprise is not stating the aims to which well-
designed legislative procedure should conduce, but rather negotiating the inevitable 
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tradeoffs between and among them. Because those aims cannot simultaneously be 
maximized, the devil is in the details, and good constitutional design requires detailed 
institutional analysis. 
B. Substantive Themes 
Before shifting to details, a brief preview of the major substantive themes may 
help to frame the analysis. Across a range of constitutional provisions and design 
problems, the constitutional law of congressional procedure displays important thematic 
regularities. 
Congressional and cameral autonomy. A major theme involves the question 
whether and in what respects Congress enjoys procedural autonomy—the legal authority 
to structure its procedures without the de jure approval of other officials or institutions. In 
general, the relevant constitutional rules might allow Congress to structure its internal 
procedures with greater or lesser independence from (1) constitutional framers, (2) the 
President, or (3) the electorate. The first issue is the question, previously discussed, about 
which rules of congressional procedure the framers should constitutionalize, and why. 
The second issue is whether and when the executive would possess the power to structure 
or participate in the internal proceedings of Congress. This was among the most 
consequential decisions that the framers faced, and is today a major constitutional-design 
question in new democratic regimes that opt for an independently-elected executive.54 
Examples under the federal constitution involve the President’s powers to convene and 
adjourn Congress and the constitutional mandate that the Vice President, an executive 
officer, preside over the Senate (except in impeachment cases). The third issue is 
implicated when the electorate’s choice of representatives is given constitutional 
significance in ways that override congressional choices. An example of this last point 
involves provisions present in several state constitutions, but conspicuously absent from 
the federal constitution, to the effect that legislatures may expel a member (usually by 
supermajority), but not twice for the same cause.55 The final proviso, seemingly a type of 
double-jeopardy guarantee, is better understood in structural terms: it allows the 
electorate to in effect override a congressional expulsion decision by reelecting a given 
representative. 
A related question involves, not the autonomy or independence of Congress, as a 
body, from other institutions, but the question of cameral autonomy—the authority of 
each house of Congress to take procedural decisions and to set procedural rules without 
the agreement of the other house. Globally speaking, the Rules of Proceedings Clause 
enables “[e]ach House [to] determine the Rules of its proceedings,”56 which suggests a 
high degree of (permitted or mandatory) cameral autonomy. In II.C.8 I shall examine 
whether the two houses acting jointly may enact a statute that binds the houses, when 
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acting separately, to follow internal procedures specified in the statute itself. As we will 
see, similar issues arise in many other procedural settings. 
The role of political parties. Our constitutional framers were essentially ignorant 
about political parties in the modern sense. Although the framers thought deeply about 
the vices of “faction,” the modern political party so greatly increases the formality and 
operative power of the 18th-century faction as to amount to a different kind of institution. 
So one of our principal tasks will be to reconsider the constitutional design of 
congressional procedure in light of the “party-in-government,”57 meaning (for our 
purposes) the institutionalization of factions within the modern Congress. 
Methodologically, this development increases the informational value of constitutions 
designed after (and with knowledge of) the spread of political parties, such as state and 
foreign constitutions of the 19th and 20th centuries. Substantively, we need to consider 
how parties affect the 18th-century blueprint for congressional procedure. In II.C.4, to 
pick only one example, we will see that optimal quorum rules may be quite different for a 
legislature composed of unaffiliated individuals, on the one hand, or a legislature 
dominated by two major parties, on the other.  
We will also see that the relationship between political parties and congressional 
autonomy is ambiguous, and will cash out differently in different settings. In some 
settings, the rise of parties will either increase or decrease the relative power of the 
executive and of legislators over congressional procedure. In II.C.3 we will examine 
these issues in the setting of the Vice-Presidency and its evolution, or devolution. On the 
other hand, to the extent that parties form cross-cutting linkages between their members 
in Congress, the executive and other institutions, then institutional power per se becomes 
less important. Partisan competition will take place across institutions, and parties will 
use institutions simply as arenas in which to stage conflict.  
The evolution of quasi-constitutional norms. Another large theme involves the 
endogenous development, within Congress, of institutional norms that parallel, 
supplement or undermine explicit constitutional rules. In II.C.6 we will examine both the 
Origination Clause, which grants the House exclusive authority to originate revenue-
raising measures, and also a parallel, endogenous norm that grants the House origination 
authority over appropriations measures as well. In II.C.5 we will examine norms of 
transparency for committee voting that, although not constitutionally mandated, 
supplement various constitutional mandates (or triggers) that require roll-call voting for 
the final passage of legislation. 
Legislative norms raise important questions both for constitutional designers who 
might anticipate their development, and for later constitutional reformers who must 
reckon with their existence. Where a desirable norm exists, or might be predicted to 
develop, should it be explicitly constitutionalized? One intuition is no, because 
constitutionalization is unnecessary, and might disrupt the norm itself. Perhaps subtly 
nuanced norms are not easily captured in relatively crude constitutional language. The 
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contrary intuition is yes: precisely because valuable norms are fragile and vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks, constitutional designers are imprudent to hope for their development 
or to rely on their persistence. Constitutionalization entrenches norms against future 
change. Where the norm already exists, that very fact provides evidence that a 
constitutional equivalent will not disrupt the legislature’s functions. 
Decision and error costs. Last, and perhaps most obviously, constitutional rules of 
legislative procedure should be designed to minimize (the sum of) the costs of reaching 
decisions and the costs of errors or mistakes. Here mistakes are defined by reference to 
whatever normative criteria are entailed by the designer’s high-level account of good 
legislative performance, or—as discussed above—by reference to the common 
denominator or overlapping consensus among competing accounts of good legislative 
performance. The ambition to minimize decision and error costs follows from the idea 
that legislatures should make efficient use of scarce resources. Reaching good decisions 
in unnecessarily costly ways, or reaching erroneous decisions, both produce deadweight 
losses. These ideas are pervasively useful, and are applied throughout. 
C. Design Questions 
With the scope of the project delineated and the major themes introduced, we will 
proceed seriatim through the major constitutional rules of congressional procedure, 
including rules that are (surprisingly) absent from the federal constitution. 
1. Convening and Adjourning the Congress 
The Constitution structures the timing and location of congressional sessions in 
several ways. In addition to the mandate of Article I and of the Twentieth Amendment 
that “[t]he Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year,” Article I also provides 
that “[n]either House, during the session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the 
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two 
Houses shall be sitting.”58 Article II gives the President the powers to “on extraordinary 
Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between 
them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he 
shall think proper.”59 A residual provision exempts agreements between the Houses on 
questions of adjournment from presentment to the President. In part these provisions 
address concerns arising from the high costs of travel and information in the founding 
era, and the fierce sectional loyalties that hampered attempts to fix the seat of 
government. Those concerns are largely obsolete today. These provisions retain great 
significance, however, for they implicate and illustrate the central thematic issues of 
congressional independence and cameral independence. 
As for the issue of congressional independence, the principal convention debates 
centered upon the twin questions whether rules about the timing and location of 
congressional sessions should be constitutionalized, and the extent to which the executive 
should be authorized to participate in the relevant decisions. The background of these 
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debates was a set of chronic complaints about executive influence over legislative 
procedure generally, and over the timing and location of legislative sessions in particular. 
The English monarchs possessed traditional prerogatives to convene and to prorogue, or 
dissolve, both Parliament and colonial legislatures. The Declaration of Independence, 
however, complained of George III that 
He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, 
and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose 
of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. —He has dissolved 
Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his 
invasions on the rights of the people. —He has refused for a long time, after 
such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; . . . 60 
As the second clause hints, a widespread view in the founding era depicted 
frequent legislative sessions as an important safeguard against executive encroachments 
on political liberty, and Article I’s provision mandating annual meetings of Congress 
was, as we have seen, justified principally on the grounds that frequent assemblies were 
necessary “as a check on the Executive department.”61 One theme in the debate involved 
the costs of travel; although some state constitutions required even more frequent 
sessions, Story argued that the geographic scale of the new republic made such a system 
excessively costly for federal representatives, given “the distance of their abodes.”62 The 
more important feature of the constitutional rules, however, was the great extent to which 
they minimized executive authority over the timing of congressional sessions, as 
compared to the English baseline. The basic asymmetry in the relevant rules is that they 
push Congress towards remaining in session. Congress is required to convene annually, 
as a check upon the freedom of executive action; the President may convene the Congress 
(on extraordinary occasions), but has no power to dissolve it against the joint wish of 
both Houses. The only circumstance in which the President may dissolve is where the 
two Houses disagree on the timing of adjournment; and the framers seem to have enacted 
this proviso only from inability to imagine that any other institution might be a plausible 
candidate to break deadlocks between the Houses (with respect to adjournment).63  
Taken as a package, these rules minimize the risk that the executive will 
aggrandize itself at Congress’ expense by means of strategic dissolution. Participants in 
the relevant debates, however, were largely insensitive to the principal cost of 
maximizing congressional autonomy in this way. A major constitutional-design 
consideration, arising in contexts ranging from congressional procedure to official 
compensation to judicial review, is that minimizing interbranch encroachment or 
aggrandizement by guaranteeing autonomy to threatened institutions constantly trades off 
                                                 
60 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, paras. 6-8 (1776). 
61 2 Kurland, supra note --- at 283. 
62 Id. at 283-84. 
63 As it turns out, the houses of Congress have never failed to agree on an adjournment date, and the 
President has never exercised his power to break disagreements over adjournment. See Charles Tiefer, 
CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE : A REFERENCE, RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 29-30, 
n.35 (1989). 
Congressional Procedure 21 
 
against an increased risk of self-dealing by those (autonomous) institutions.64 The 
constitutional rules that enable aggressor institutions to encroach upon competitors are 
the same rules that keep the competitor’s strategic self-dealing in check; the risk of 
aggrandizement is a typical byproduct of a design choice to minimize self-interested 
official action through institutional competition. In the extreme scenario—a scenario that 
materialized at several points in English history—we might imagine that a legislature 
granted constitutional autonomy over the timing of its own dissolution might, for self-
interested reasons, choose never to dissolve at all. As William Rawle observed,  
[A] power in the legislature to protract its own continuance, would be 
dangerous. Blackstone attributed the misfortunes of Charles I to his having 
unadvisedly passed an act to continue the parliament, then in being, until 
such time as it should please to dissolve itself, and this is one of the many 
proofs that the much-praised constitution of that country wants the character 
of certainty.65  
To be sure, as Rawle also observed, the constitutional provision for limited congressional 
terms of course sets an outer bound on the size of this danger; “[n]o act of Congress 
could prolong the continuance of the legislature beyond the term fixed by the 
Constitution.”66 Yet within that capacious limit Congress may manipulate adjournment 
with a view to maximizing its members’ chances of retaining office or to imposing 
political costs on the President. In modern times examples of strategic use of the 
adjournment power are thick on the ground.67 
Nor is it difficult to imagine institutional-design alternatives that might attain the 
same degree of legislative independence from the executive while creating a reduced risk 
of strategic legislative behavior, thus producing a design improvement on any view of the 
necessary tradeoffs. Even if autonomy and self-dealing trade off against each other 
beyond some specified point, in other words, institutional-design proposals might 
produce gains along both margins if that point has not yet been reached. One possibility 
would be to randomly select the date of adjournment at the beginning of the legislative 
session; under this rule the adjournment date would be chosen for no reason at all, but it 
would at least not be chosen for self-interested reasons held by either legislators or the 
executive. Under this regime legislators anticipating the adjournment date might still 
engage in strategic behavior, using the confusion of the session’s close to push through 
projects that would have failed earlier in the session. Here the intuition is that the sheer 
volume of business that always marks the end of legislative sessions increases the costs to 
other legislators and interest groups of detecting and blocking such legislation. But the 
same behavior is possible in the current regime so long as the adjournment date is 
announced in advance; and we shall subsequently examine state constitutional provisions 
                                                 
64 For some earlier efforts to apply this point in various settings, see Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional 
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that check this sort of strategic action by providing that no bills may be enacted or, 
alternatively, introduced within a specified time of adjournment. The time between the 
constitutionally-specified date and the date of adjournment is time in which public 
opprobrium may be brought to bear on legislators for their actions late in the session. 
Alternatively, the randomly-chosen date of adjournment need not be established 
and announced in advance. Another possibility is sequential randomization, in which the 
legislative session is subject to a specified chance of ending abruptly on any particular 
day. The resultant uncertainty would force legislators to set the volume and timing of 
legislative business behind a partial veil of ignorance.68 It is true, however, that both this 
possibility and the preceding one have an impractical air about them, if only because 
constitutional rules rarely employ randomization, even where randomization would have 
obvious benefits.69 
Cameral autonomy—the reciprocal independence of each House from the other, 
rather than the independence of Congress from the executive—was also an important 
consideration in the debates over the timing and location of congressional sessions. Here 
the principal debates centered on the Article I provision that barred either house from 
adjourning without the other’s consent. In the view of proponents, such as Madison, this 
provision minimized the chance that Congress would fail to be in session when “public 
exigencies” warranted legislative action.70 (This rationale assumes that the false negative, 
the failure to be in session when the public interest so requires, is more damaging than 
the false positive, the occurrence of a legislative session when there is no real public 
business to conduct. By contrast, many state constitutions seek to minimize the false 
positive by providing, for example, that the legislature may convene only every other 
year.) In the view of Madison’s opponents, however, the vice of the Article I provision 
was to create an unacceptable risk that the Senate would dominate the House of 
Representatives. As George Mason put it in the Virginia ratifying convention, 
The house of representatives is the only check on the senate, with their 
enormous powers. But by that clause you give them the power of worrying 
the house of representatives into a compliance with any measure. The 
senators living at the spot will feel no inconvenience from long sessions, as 
they will vote themselves handsome pay, without incurring any additional 
expences. Your representatives are on a different ground, from their shorter 
continuance in office. The gentlemen from Georgia are six or seven hundred 
miles from home, and wish to go home. The senate taking advantage of this, 
by stopping the other house from adjourning, may worry them into any 
thing.71  
The argument of this confused passage seems to assume that federal legislative careers 
would always remain a part-time or even amateur pursuit. The greater the fraction of 
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representatives’ income that is obtained from local business or professional pursuits 
outside the legislative session, the more the joint-consent rule for adjournment increases 
the relative leverage of senators. Today, however, the sharply reduced costs of travel and 
the professionalization of federal legislative careers has made Mason’s particular concern 
anachronistic. 
2. Membership: Disqualification and Expulsion 
Article I provides that “[e]ach House may . . . punish its members for disorderly 
behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.”72 This short clause 
raises no less than three interpretive puzzles that we must clear away before addressing 
questions of optimal constitutional design. The first puzzle is whether the two-thirds 
supermajority vote requires two thirds of the whole expelling House, or merely two-
thirds of a quorum (i.e. of a majority); this is a question about supermajority quorum 
requirements, examined below. A second and more fundamental puzzle involves the 
relationship between the Expulsion Clause and the power of each House to “be the Judge 
of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own members.”73 On one view, the 
distinction between these powers is temporal: disqualification by a simple majority can 
occur only before a member is seated, while after a member is seated the only recourse is 
expulsion by supermajority. A different view, which I will adopt, is David Currie’s 
argument that the distinction between the powers turns solely on the ground on which 
each may be exercised. “A simple majority may determine at any time that a member is 
not qualified; expulsion of a duly elected member for any other reason requires stronger 
support.”74 The final puzzle is whether the “disorderly Behaviour” that the same clause 
authorizes each House to punish refers only to behavior that disrupts legislative business, 
or whether expulsion instead lies for a broader category of conduct, including conduct 
occurring outside the legislature itself and conduct during a legislative recess. Here both 
congressional and judicial precedent have taken an expansive view of the expulsion 
power: following Story’s analysis of early expulsion cases in the Senate, the Supreme 
Court has said that “[t]he right to expel extends to all cases where the offense is such as 
in the judgment of the senate is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member.”75 
The framers’ decision to lodge the powers of disqualification and expulsion in 
each House separately, without the participation of any outside institution, embodies two 
decisions, one in favor of cameral autonomy and one in favor of congressional autonomy. 
As to the first, it is hardly unimaginable that the power to disqualify or expel a member of 
either House (briefly, the power to make “membership decisions”) could have been 
lodged in the houses acting jointly. The obvious analogy is to the powers surrounding 
impeachment, which are partitioned between the two houses in complex ways: the House 
of Representatives possesses the “sole Power of Impeachment,” while the Senate 
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74 David P. Currie, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829 at 75 (2001). The 
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possesses the “sole Power to try all Impeachments,” and may convict by a supermajority 
of two-thirds of “the Members present.” Impeachment lies only against “civil Officers of 
the United States,” 76 but it is hardly obvious that federal legislators do not count as such 
officers. Early Congresses struggled mightily with the issue before apparently concluding 
that legislators are “officers” for purposes of the presidential succession provisions of 
Article II, but not for purposes of the impeachment provisions.77 
Analogously, we might imagine a constitutional division of labor in which one 
House brings a proceeding for disqualification or expulsion of its own members, with the 
merits of the charge judged by the other House. The framers’ choice in favor of cameral 
autonomy might, on this view, be condemned in the vocabulary of the common law on 
the ground that it makes each House the sole judge of its own cause in membership cases. 
The contrary instinct, a pervasive one in both the constitutional structure and in 18th-
century legal theory, is to separate the power to prosecute from the power to adjudicate.78 
The point must be qualified in light of the Supreme Court’s quite recent assertion of 
power to review cameral disqualification decisions, discussed below, but of course that 
decision has not yet been extended to expulsion decisions; here the question is simply 
cameral autonomy, not the involvement of noncongressional institutions. 
The argument for cameral autonomy in membership decisions is that the Houses 
are institutional competitors, so that cross-participation in membership decisions creates a 
risk of intercameral aggrandizement, with the reviewing House basing its decisions on 
partisan or institutional advantage rather than the constitutional merits. But here, as 
elsewhere, the basic cost of cameral autonomy is an enhanced risk of self-dealing by 
legislative factions, in the absence of any mechanism for external review. To be sure, the 
symmetry of the cross-participation alternative, in which each House reviews the other’s 
decisions, might produce a possible ameliorating mechanism: each House might refrain 
from patently self-interested review for fear of retaliation by the other. Yet if membership 
cases are rare (they are), and if retaliation on other margins entirely (say, by refusing to 
enact bills sought by the offending House) is a highly imperfect substitute, then the fear 
of retaliation will prove at best a weak deterrent, subject to domination by the political 
gains that might flow to the aggrandizing House from self-interested review in particular 
cases. 
The framers’ second design choice—to lodge the powers of disqualification and 
expulsion in (the houses of) Congress alone, without the participation of other 
institutions—implicates similar considerations. If it currently seems unimaginable to 
lodge review or approval of expulsion decisions in an outside institution, consider the 
many analogies elsewhere in the constitutional structure. Many of the stock founding-era 
arguments for subjecting legislative lawmaking to presidential review, by means of the 
veto power, transpose comfortably to membership decisions; it is hard to see any a priori 
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reason for thinking that those decisions are any less or more susceptible to the sort of 
factionalized decisionmaking and legislative herd behavior that caused the framers to 
provide the presidential veto. It is irrelevant that the Article I lawmaking process contains 
a built-in status quo default (a successful veto prevents a change in the law), while 
membership decisions, especially qualification decisions, sometimes require a 
compulsory choice between alternative candidates, with no legal default position. Even in 
the latter case the President or other outside body might be given the power to review the 
grounds on which the choice is made, with a remand to the initiating House if those 
grounds are found to have been illegitimate. Beyond the possibility of review by the 
President, we must also consider the possibility of review of membership decisions by the 
Supreme Court. The Court has already undertaken a limited version of such review in 
disqualification cases, albeit only as to the legal question whether the asserted ground of 
disqualification is among those set out in Article I. 
To set against the possibility of outside review by other federal institutions is the 
standard legislative-autonomy argument: authority over membership decisions should be 
vested solely in the legislature in order to minimize the risk of aggrandizement by 
competing institutions. Consider Story’s argument for legislative autonomy in 
membership decisions:  
It is obvious, that a power must be lodged somewhere to judge of the 
elections, returns and qualifications of the members of each house 
composing the legislature; for otherwise there could be no certainty, as to 
who were legitimately chosen members . . . . The only possible question on 
such a subject is, as to the body, in which such a power shall be lodged. If 
lodged in any other, than the legislative body itself, its independence, its 
purity, and even its existence and action may be destroyed, or put into 
imminent danger. No other body, but itself, can have the same motives to 
preserve and perpetuate these attributes . . . .79 
The fallacy here is by now obvious. Story’s argument, which implicitly compares a well-
motivated legislature with an ill-motivated reviewing body, amounts to an incomplete 
cost-benefit analysis. It ignores the potential costs of legislative autonomy, if ill-
motivated legislative factions use membership decisions for partisan ends, and the 
potential benefits of external review, if well-motivated executive or judicial officials 
provide an impartial assessment of qualifications, the disruptive effects of legislators’ 
behavior, and other relevant questions. 
Given this structural tradeoff between legislative autonomy and legislative self-
dealing, we may interpret the supermajority requirement for expulsion as an attempt to 
minimize the costs of the latter while maximizing the benefits of the former. Madison’s 
idea, anticipating modern work on the economics of voting rules,80 was to minimize 
factional abuse not by mandating outside review, but by raising the costs of assembling 
the necessary faction. Supermajority rules are close substitutes for bicameralism, so 
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requiring the former in effect compromises cameral autonomy over expulsion decisions 
without involving outsiders. 
There are, however, two serious objections to Madison’s design choice. First, as 
we have seen, the supermajority requirement creates costs on another margin, the one 
identified by Gouvernor Morris: the supermajority requirement minimizes false positives, 
unjustified decisions to expel, but increases false negatives, unjustified decisions not to 
expel.81 Second, and less obviously, the supermajority rule for expulsions does nothing to 
minimize abuse of the disqualification power, and that gap encourages legislative 
substitution from ill-motivated expulsion to ill-motivated disqualification; the attempted 
disqualification of Adam Clayton Powell may have been an example. To the extent that 
substitution from partisan expulsion to partisan disqualification occurs, it supports the 
Supreme Court’s decision to limit the grounds for disqualification to the narrow lists set 
out in Article I.82 This is a nonoriginalist defense of the Court’s disqualification 
jurisprudence, one that sounds strictly in functional terms and thereby improves upon the 
exhausting and inconclusive originalist debates about the exclusivity of the Qualification 
Clauses that fractured the Court both in Powell v. McCormack83 and in U.S. Term Limits 
v. Thornton.84  
 A promising alternative to the supermajority requirement is embodied in state 
constitutional provisions that bar legislatures from twice expelling a member for the same 
conduct.85 The effect of the state provisions is to create a mechanism for outside review 
by lodging in the electorate a power to override the legislature’s expulsion decision, so 
these provisions compromise legislative autonomy, vis-à-vis the electorate. On the most 
extreme version of legislative autonomy, one actually articulated by legislators during 
early expulsion proceedings, “the voters should not be able to elect anyone repugnant to 
two thirds of the House.”86 The response to this view is not an abstract argument from 
democratic theory, that the legislature ought to be bound to respect the voters’ choice of 
representative; that argument would condemn any legislative power to expel a duly 
elected member, in any circumstances. The right argument for this sort of provision is 
simply that this form of outside review is, as a matter of institutional design, superior to 
any of the alternatives, either the supermajority requirement or the hypothetical 
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alternatives that would vest review of expulsion decisions in the other House or in the 
President. Unlike the supermajority requirement, the electoral-review mechanism carries 
no built-in skew in favor of false negatives; unlike outside review by other federal 
institutions, it does not place the reviewing function in the hands of a presumptively 
hostile institutional competitor. 
The state-level rule barring a second expulsion for the same conduct might 
plausibly be interpolated into the existing constitutional text.87 I have already sketched 
the consequentialist case for that reading, but it might be justified on originalist grounds 
as well. In the founding era, famous Parliamentary precedents arising out of the expulsion 
of John Wilkes were widely cited as establishing the bar on re-expulsion,88 and early 
legislators suggested that a similar rule might itself be implicit in Article I’s expulsion 
provision.89 Under the current constitutional rules, however, an interpolated requirement 
barring re-expulsion would be cumulative with, rather than a substitute for, the 
supermajority requirement, so this is ultimately an argument for constitutional reform 
rather than simply a novel interpretation. Yet several state constitutions contain the same 
combination of supermajority rules with a ban on second expulsions.90 Given the usual 
fog of empirical uncertainty that hovers around questions of optimal constitutional 
design, interpreters of the federal constitution might do well to mimic those jurisdictions, 
thereby assuming, until it is proven otherwise, that an interpolated ban on re-expulsion 
would produce a net improvement. 
3. Legislative Officers 
The Constitution grants the House of Representatives full authority to “chuse their 
Speaker and other Officers.”91 Not so for the Senate; Article I specifies that “[t]he Vice 
President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, 
unless they be equally divided.”92 Although the senators are authorized to “chuse their 
other Officers,”93 they must also choose “a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the 
Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.”94 
Implicit in these provisions are a number of important design choices. Generally 
speaking, legislative officers may be chosen by the legislature itself or by some other 
body, such as constitutional framers or the executive; they may be members of the 
legislature in their own right, or else outsiders; and legislative officers may hold full 
voting rights, including the power to cast tiebreaking votes, may hold limited voting 
rights, such as the power to cast votes only to break ties, or may hold no voting rights at 
all. We will examine the framers’ choices along these dimensions and compare them with 
Bentham’s views about the optimal structure of legislative officeholding. 
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The convention’s most important decision was the threshold choice to 
constitutionalize the Senate’s presiding officer. Why should not the Senate, like the 
House, have been given discretion to choose all of its officers? In Part I we examined 
good normative reasons to constitutionalize rules of congressional procedure. As a 
historical matter the convention’s decision does not seem to have been motivated, at least 
not in the main, by any such reasons. Rather the major impetus behind the decision was 
simply the desire to give the Vice President some official function, other than standing by 
in hopes of succeeding the President. Roger Sherman argued that “[I]f the Vice President 
were not to be President of the Senate, he would be without employment.”95 Oliver 
Williamson likewise observed that “such an officer as Vice President was not wanted. He 
was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be 
chosen at the same time.”96 The reference here is to the electoral scheme for President 
and Vice President adopted in Article II, §3, and later modified by the Twelfth 
Amendment.  
 This is not to say, however, that no normatively attractive reasons for the 
constitutional choice of the Senate’s presiding officer existed; some were even discussed 
at the convention. Sherman buttressed his argument for Vice Presidential employment 
with the idea that, if the presiding officer were chosen from among the senators, “some 
member by being made President must be deprived of his vote, unless when an equal 
division of votes might happen in the Senate, which would be but seldom.”97 The premise 
of this argument was wrong; the member chosen to preside might be allowed both to vote 
in the ordinary course and given a tiebreaking vote. This alternative, however, would in 
effect give the presiding member two votes. Story’s improved version articulated the 
dilemma:  
If the speaker were not allowed to vote, except where there was an equal 
division, independent of his own vote, then the state might lose its own 
voice; if he were allowed to give his vote, and also a casting vote, then the 
state might, in effect, possess a double vote.98  
Unfortunately, however, both Sherman’s original argument and Story’s 
improvement rest on a non sequitur. At most the voting argument shows that the Senate 
should be constitutionally required to choose a presiding officer from outside the 
membership. It does not show that the constitutional convention should itself have 
decided who that outsider would be. To support that separate choice requires, in addition, 
some reason to believe that the framers have some comparative advantage over future 
Senates in choosing the outsider who should preside. 
The same problem afflicts a second argument for constitutionalizing the presiding 
officer’s identity, an argument articulated by early commentators but not in the 
convention itself. On this view, state jealousies made it imperative that the presiding 
office be held by an impartial outsider. Senators, elected by state legislatures, were to be 
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national representative of the states; the Vice President, although a citizen of some state, 
was not elected from any state in particular, and would be able to preside over the Senate 
without the appearance of sectional favoritism. (On this view, the House could be given 
authority to choose officers from among its own membership, who represent districts, not 
states). The impartiality argument accords with Bentham’s idea that “in a numerous 
legislative assembly, a president ought not be a member,” an “exclusion” that is in part 
intended “to guarantee him from the seductions of partiality, and to raise him even above 
suspicion, by never exhibiting him as a partisan in the midst of debates in which he is 
required to interfere as a judge.”99 
But the non sequitur problem remains: the argument from impartiality does not 
entail that the outsider should be chosen by constitutional framers. Bentham correctly 
distinguished the two points by stipulating both that the presiding officer should be an 
outsider, and also should be chosen “freely and exclusively by the assembly over which 
he is to preside.”100 It might be said that these two stipulations are inconsistent because 
the exclusion of members from the presiding office curtails the members’ free choice of a 
presiding officer, but this is an implausible objection. Generally, choice is not made 
unfree by the presence of legal constraints, and under any imaginable design, the 
members would be forced to choose their presiding officer within some set of 
constitutional constraints, such as the requirement of Article VI that all federal officers 
take an oath to support the Constitution. A more respectable, because more pragmatic, 
argument for the convention’s decision to choose the identity of the presiding officer is 
that the very state rivalries that require an outsider to preside would also prevent the 
Senate itself from reaching a consensus on the identity of that outsider. Yet we might also 
imagine that the necessity for compromise would have caused the Senate to choose the 
lowest common denominator from among the candidates presented, settling upon a 
presiding officer inoffensive to all concerned. That has historically been the pattern in the 
Senate’s choice of the President pro tempore who presides in the Vice President’s 
absence. 
Even if the convention had good reason to choose the identity of the outsider 
given authority to preside, rather than leaving the choice to future Senates, it was a 
separate and equally contestable decision to mandate that the presiding outsider be a high 
official in the executive branch. The mandated choice of an outsider compromises 
legislative autonomy in the service of impartiality, but the mandate that the outsider be an 
executive officer adds the usual risk of aggrandizement by institutional competitors. As 
Elbridge Gerry put it at the convention, “we might as well put the President himself at the 
head of the Legislature. The close intimacy that must subsist between the President and 
Vice President makes it absolutely improper.”101 Morris’ memorable response was that 
“[t]he vice president then will be the first heir apparent that ever loved his father”;102 in 
general, many framers anticipated that the President and Vice President would be 
institutional rivals, rather than allies, in part because of the latter’s perpetual hope of 
succeeding the former, in part because the two officers were to be selected independently, 
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and were each anticipated to be drawn from among the nation’s leading politicians.103 On 
this view, the Senate would have little to fear from the Vice President’s status as 
presiding officer. 
The risk of interbranch aggression created by the Vice President’s constitutional 
role has indeed never materialized,104 but not for the reasons the framers envisaged. The 
Vice President’s structural rivalry with the President has become a minor theme, because 
the enactment of the Twelfth Amendment and the rise of joint party slates for the two 
offices made the Vice President a nonentity in the 19th century,105 while the consolidation 
of presidential power to nominate the Vice President made the office a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the Presidency in the 20th.106 These developments might have posed a real 
risk of presidential domination of the Senate, if the Senate had not developed various 
means of self-defense, including Senate precedents suggesting that the Vice President 
may act only as directed by the Senate’s own rules, and lacks any intrinsic constitutional 
authority to keep order or to make procedural rulings.107 The framers were wrong about 
the political mechanisms that have dampened the risks created by their choice of the 
Senate’s presiding officer; the benign outcome of their choices is in this sense best 
described as a lucky historical accident. 
Finally, we need to consider Bentham’s argument that an appropriately impartial 
presiding officer would possess no right to vote, even to break ties.108 Indeed, for 
Bentham, the rule authorizing the presiding officer to vote only to break ties “is more 
opposed to impartiality that that of allowing him to vote in all cases.”109 On this view, the 
framers’ decision to grant the Vice President a tiebreaking vote undermines the 
impartiality rationale that best justifies his status as a senatorial officer to begin with, and 
this is so whether the alternative is full voting rights110 or no vote at all. The mechanism 
that Bentham has in mind here is, however, obscure; why should voting only to break ties 
create a greater appearance of partiality than casting both tiebreaking votes and ordinary 
ones? Recall that on Story’s view the latter regime in effect doubles the partisan import 
                                                 
103 This rivalry of course was the impetus behind the rule that the Chief Justice, rather than the Vice 
President, would preside over the impeachment trial of a President. The concern was not that the Vice 
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104 It is, however, a mistake to think that the Vice President’s role is vestigial or a historical curiosity; 
recurrently, if infrequently, the Vice President’s authority to make procedural rulings importantly affects 
legislative outcomes, and the tiebreaking vote is a significant power (Dole episode). 
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of the Vice President’s vote. We may, however, save Bentham’s argument by interpreting 
it in expressive rather than consequentialist terms, as a claim that the tiebreak-only 
regime creates an inconsistent symbolism. On this view, the abstention from ordinary 
voting in the tiebreak-only regime creates a pretense of impartiality that is violated 
whenever a tiebreaking vote is cast, whereas the regime that includes ordinary voting 
makes no pretense that the presiding officer is impartial in the first place.  
  The upshot of all this is that the framers’ decisions to foist the Vice President 
upon the Senate and to give the Vice President (only) a tiebreaking vote both seem 
dubious from the standpoint of sound constitutional design. What is worse, the former 
decision may also have been unnecessary. The simpler solution to the problem of Vice 
Presidential unemployment, if it is a problem at all, would have been to mandate, not that 
he be given a legislative post, but that he be given additional executive duties111—
perhaps as one of the “Heads of Departments” or cabinet officers, perhaps as an 
“Ambassador, public Minister or Consul,” the existence of which are presupposed by 
Article II. Such an arrangement would have eliminated the institutional risks of cross-
branch service. And, as it turns out, subordinate executive and diplomatic tasks are what 
Vice Presidents mostly do anyway. 
4. Voting Rules and Quorum Rules 
Article I sets the basic quorum rule for congressional voting by 
providing that: a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do 
Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be 
authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, 
and under such Penalties as each House may provide.112 
In the ordinary case of simple majority voting this provision is straightforward 
enough. An important interpretive question arises, however, when the Constitution 
specifies that a supermajority vote is needed to execute some power vested in one or both 
Houses separately, such as the expulsion of a member or the approval of a treaty, or in 
the Congress jointly, such as the override of a presidential veto. Does the heightened 
voting requirement mean that a supermajority of the whole House is needed, or is only a 
supermajority of a majority needed? Although this question is sometimes thought to 
implicate the constitutional quorum rule,113 it doesn’t. Whatever the voting rule, a 
quorum to do business is present if and only if a majority of the relevant House is present. 
The possibility that a supermajority requirement is satisfied only if a supermajority of the 
whole House votes in favor of a bill is an interpretation of the voting rule itself. Quorum 
rules, by contrast, are insensitive to whether votes are cast for or against a bill; a quorum 
can be composed of both aye votes and no votes. Nonetheless I will treat this question 
under the slightly misleading head of “supermajority quorum rules,” to follow previous 
discussions and as a useful shorthand. 
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We will begin by examining the ordinary quorum rule from the standpoint of 
optimal legislative design, and will then show that the question of supermajority quorum 
rules has no independent significance; it collapses entirely into the question of optimal 
voting rules.  
Ordinary quorum rules. Define a quorum rule as any rule that permits the 
legislature to conduct business with less than all members present; we will then ask what 
effects are produced as the quorum rule is decreased from the full number of members 
down to one member. In general, where the underlying voting rule is enactment by 
simple majority, there will be strong pressure to adopt a majority quorum requirement as 
well. If a minority cannot defeat an enactment on the merits, the intuition runs, why 
should the same minority be able to block an enactment by absenting themselves and 
thereby breaking the quorum? Conversely, with a high quorum rule, such as three-fourths 
majority, a handful of legislators may extract strategic concessions by threatening to 
prevent a majority from enacting its preferred policy. As Gouvernor Morris observed at 
the convention, “the Secession of a small number ought not to be suffered to break a 
quorum. . . . Besides other mischiefs, if a few can break up a quorum, they may seize a 
moment when a particular part of the Continent may be in need of immediate aid, to 
extort, by threatening a secession, some unjust and selfish measure.”114 The costs of 
organizing this sort of holdout faction to break the quorum rise as the quorum rule is 
reduced. 
To be sure, empowering minorities to defeat legislation by breaking the quorum 
will in some cases also reduce majoritarian exploitation. George Mason “admitted that 
inconveniences might spring from the secession of a small number: But he had also 
known good produced by an apprehension of it. He had known a paper emission 
prevented by that cause in Virginia.”115 The combination of this point with the previous 
one just means that high quorum requirements display the same mix of costs and benefits 
as a supermajority voting rule. Given these considerations, the combination of simple 
majority voting rules with supermajority quorum requirements is a rare one in state and 
foreign constitutions.116 The prevalence of simple majority voting in most legislatures for 
most matters, that is, sets an effective upper bound on quorum requirements for those 
matters. 
The harder question is why there should be a lower bound, why there should be 
any quorum requirement at all. Following Bentham, we may identify three principal costs 
that may be incurred when legislatures proceed with business despite high rates of 
absenteeism.117 The first costs is outcome error, defined as any difference between the 
outcomes that the legislature would produce with full attendance and the outcomes it 
produces with a bare quorum present. Low attendance increases the variance of 
legislative outcomes and thus the possibility of countermajoritarian results. One ambition 
of quorum rules is to minimize this form of error by ensuring that the legislature may not 
proceed with only a few in attendance. A second cost is the loss of legitimacy said to 
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result when the legislature proceeds without a full complement or even majority 
participation. As Bentham put it, “is the part absent greater than that which is present? 
The public knows not to which to adhere. In every state of the case, the incomplete 
assembly will have less influence than the complete assembly.”118 A third cost is the 
deliberative deficit produced by low attendance. On a Condorcetian interpretation of 
legislative deliberation, any reduction in the number voting reduces the probability that 
the eventual majority’s decision is correct, so long as each legislator is more likely to be 
right than wrong, and where there are right (and wrong) answers to be found.119 Even 
where the subject for legislative deliberation involves value choices, more heads may still 
be better than fewer, if exposure to a broader number and variety of views blocks group 
polarization and dampens opinion cascades.120 
To be sure, if attendance is optional then self-selection may ensure that the 
attending legislators are precisely those most informed and most engaged on the relevant 
subjects, and this may be the best subset of deliberators available. Yet against this 
optimistic story is the possibility that self-selected attenders will hold extreme 
preferences or biased views; legislators with lower stakes in outcomes may prove more 
dispassionate deliberators, albeit less informed ones. Conversely, legislators’ willingness 
to invest in the information needed to cast an intelligent vote may itself be a product of 
attending the legislature, so that legislators induced to attend by quorum rules or other 
institutional reasons, rather than by the stakes or intrinsic interest of the subject matter, 
might fear to be seen casting an obviously uninformed vote and might thus learn enough 
to form a reasonably defensible view, or at least to decide intelligently which other 
legislator’s position should be copied. 
It is tempting to think that the outcome errors produced by low attendance are 
harmless. The legislative majority that would have prevailed with full attendance may, on 
this view, simply repeal the minoritarian enactment the next time it assembles, and the 
minority, anticipating this, will refrain from the useless exercise. As Bentham described 
parliamentary practice, “[I]f the decision taken by the small number be contrary to the 
wish of the majority, they assemble in force the day following, and abrogate the work of 
the previous day.”121 The ability to reverse minoritarian legislative action functions as an 
ultimate constraint that reduces the importance of the quorum minimum, a point missed 
by George Mason when he argued to the convention that without a quorum minimum 
“the U[nited] States might be governed by a Juncto.” 
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Yet the constraint is a weak one, and may fail on either de jure or de facto 
grounds. If the legal regime permits the legislature to enact entrenched statutes, 
irrepealable by later legislative enactments (although not by constitutional amendment), 
then the legislative minority’s initial act may stand. Moreover, in Parliament and in some 
states, constitutional or quasi-constitutional traditions or rules bar reconsideration of 
rejected bills within the same legislative session, based on a general rule that “the same 
question should not be twice offered” within that session.122 If these rules are interpreted 
expansively, so that the earlier enactment is deemed a rejection of the opposite proposal, 
they may preclude intra-session reversals. Even if the legal regime neither permits 
entrenchment nor bars reversals within the session, it may be more difficult for the 
legislative majority to repeal an earlier minoritarian enactment than it would have been to 
vote it down in the first instance, even if the enactment has only been law for a brief 
period. The change in the status quo point may affect outcomes if some legislators 
support neither the enactment nor its repeal, perhaps because they desire to use that 
portion of the legislative agenda to pursue other business entirely. An implication of these 
considerations is that constitutions that permit entrenching statutes or that bar 
reconsideration of enactments within the same legislative session should, all else equal, 
have higher legislative quorum requirements than constitutions that do not—subject to a 
qualification to be discussed below.   
Bentham also goes wrong by saying that “every proposition the success of which 
has resulted from absence, and which would have been rejected in the full assembly” 
should be counted as a “surprise.”123 With rational expectations, however, absentees will 
anticipate that diminished attendance increases the variance of legislative outcomes and 
thus the possibility of results that contradict the preferences of the legislative majority. 
The result may, however, come as a surprise to the public, if monitoring of absenteeism is 
imperfect. Moreover, in two-party systems error in Bentham’s sense occurs only when 
there is asymmetrical absenteeism, such that the absentees from the party that would 
prevail with full attendance are sufficiently more numerous than the absentees from the 
minority party as to reverse the outcome. The modern Senate has evolved a complex 
norm that reduces the error costs of asymmetrical absenteeism: the pair system, under 
which senators form agreements with members of the other party not to vote. Although 
the pair system makes the senators immediately concerned better off by permitting 
symmetrical absences, it might be said to create an externality by increasing absenteeism 
and thereby detracting from legislative deliberation. We will return to this concern below. 
 Against the foregoing benefits of quorum rules must be set their principal cost, 
which is to block legislative action. Here too quorum rules resemble supermajority rules, 
in their common bias in favor of the status quo. A less obvious complication is that 
attendance may itself be an endogenous effect of the quorum rule, at least in part. As 
Gouvernor Morris brilliantly argued at the convention, “fix the [quorum] number low and 
they [i.e. legislators] will generally attend knowing that advantage may be taken of their 
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absence.”124 To the extent that this rational-expectations account is persuasive then 
increasing, rather than decreasing, the harms that legislative minorities may inflict by 
opportunistic action in the legislative majority’s absence will maximize the expected 
costs of failure to attend and thereby maximize attendance. On this view, legal regimes 
that permit entrenching statutes, that bar intra-session reversals, and so forth should have 
lower quorum requirements, not higher ones. But the flaw in this position is that 
maximizing attendance is an implausible aim; some absences are strategic, but some are 
justified, so the right maximand is not attendance simpliciter but attendance-without-
good-excuse. 
 Quorum rules are not, of course, the only rules that affect attendance. Two other 
variables that have indirect effects on attendance are the transparency of legislative 
proceedings and the permissibility of proxy voting, either in committee or on the floor. 
The publication of roll-call votes encourages attendance if there is a political cost to 
absenteeism; there is some empirical evidence for this.125 I examine transparency and its 
effects below. As for the second issue, proxy voting has never been permissible on the 
floor of either house; it was largely abolished in House committees in 1995, although it 
continues in Senate committees and in intercameral conferences.126 Although the 
permissibility of proxies affects attendance, it does not follow that the proxy rules can or 
should be calibrated with the sole aim of optimizing attendance. Although proxies lower 
the costs of absenteeism, and thus reinforce the deliberative externality we have 
discussed, proxy voting also serves or (in the House) served as an instrument of 
majoritarianism, “ensuring that political control could not slip away to a well-organized 
minority that might concentrate its strength at a single location for a ‘sneak attack’ on the 
majority.”127 Maximizing attendance prevents countermajoritarian surprise, but if less 
than full attendance is a given, a ban on proxy voting may undermine majoritarian 
control.  
Jiggering the quorum rules, transparency rules and rules about proxy voting so as 
indirectly to maximize or optimize attendance thus looks like a difficult and potentially 
counterproductive enterprise. It might seem that the more straightforward procedure is 
simply to establish penalties for nonattendance by statute or internal rule. Almost all 
jurisdictions thus permit a minority smaller than a quorum to enact rules and set penalties 
to compel attendance by other legislators, and Bentham proposed an intricate system 
under which absentees would suffer an automatic deduction from salaries or deposited 
funds. Yet in many jurisdictions such rules go largely unenforced, not or not only because 
of collusion between the enforcing legislative officers and the offending legislators, but 
because of the undesirable side effects of a compulsory regime. Mandating a fine for 
nonattendance may implicitly announce that “a fine is a price” and thereby undermine, 
rather than reinforce, social norms that support legislative attendance. Moreover, if 
legislators differ widely in personal wealth, as they do in the House of Representatives, 
then a system of fines might produce (in Bentham’s words) “two classes in the 
assembly—those who were paid for their functions, and those who paid for not fulfilling 
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them.”128 Bentham fell back on the idea that attendance might be enforced by criminal 
sanctions, but this seems implausible, given quasi-constitutional traditions of legislators’ 
personal immunity and the high procedural costs of disproving legislators’ stock excuses. 
Finally, compelling attendance is inadequate to prevent strategic quorum-breaking if the 
quorum is determined by the number of votes cast on a roll call (the traditional practice), 
and if the minority may attend the legislature without casting votes. In the 19th century 
strategic refusal to vote was frequently used as a delaying tactic, and was suppressed only 
in 1890, thanks to a ruling by the Speaker of the House that members physically present 
but not voting counted towards a quorum.129 
Given that optimizing attendance through direct regulation is as problematic as 
the indirect regulation that animates quorum rules, most jurisdictions parallel (or copy) 
the federal constitution by adopting a mix of the two strategies, using quorum minima 
within a narrow range (typically a majority, occasionally two-thirds) and adding 
legislative authority to compel attendance. On this score the framers seem to have gotten 
things about right, at least if we ignore their failure to anticipate strategic refusals to vote, 
and at least in the sense that no strikingly superior alternatives to their major design 
choices exist.  
Supermajority “quorum” rules. The framers, however, blundered by leaving open 
the critical interpretive question whether the express majority quorum for ordinary 
majority voting still obtains where the Constitution requires a supermajority of the votes 
cast. The constitutional text is ambiguous on the question of supermajority quorum rules. 
In several places, including the supermajority rules for treaties and impeachment, the 
framers pointedly provided that a supermajority vote “of the members present” would 
suffice; this suggests by negative implication that in other settings, such as the 
supermajority requirements for veto overrides or constitutional amendments, two-thirds 
of the whole membership of each House is required. Against this is the idea that where 
the framers wanted to vary the ordinary quorum rule, they did so expressly. An example 
is the Article II procedure by which the House of Representatives chooses the President; 
the framers provided that “a quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or 
Members from two thirds of the States,” even though (only) “a Majority of all the States 
shall be necessary to a Choice.”130 That the framers required a supermajority in any 
particular setting need not entail an implicit decision to require a supermajority of the 
whole body, rather than simply a supermajority of a majority quorum. In settings that 
expressly require a supermajority vote yet are silent about quorum rules, “the Framers 
expressly changed the multiplier for determining the requisite majority; there was no 
reason to think they had also changed the multiplicand.”131 
The stakes of the issue are high. In a house comprising 100 legislators a majority 
of a majority (the ordinary quorum rule) requires only 26 votes, a two-thirds 
supermajority of a majority requires 34 votes, and a two-thirds supermajority of the 
whole requires as many as 66 votes. The difference between the second and third 
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thresholds is far greater than the difference between the second and first. In light of the 
foregoing analysis, however, this interpretive question is easily resolved on 
consequentialist grounds. The principal constraint on supermajoritarian quorum rules is 
the ubiquity of the simple-majority voting rule, and this constraint disappears when the 
underlying voting rule is itself supermajoritarian. Nor, of course, is the indirect effect of 
quorum rules on legislative attendance an important consideration here. A quorum must 
be present whether supermajority requirements are interpreted to require a supermajority 
of the whole House, or just a supermajority of a majority. In the absence of those 
considerations, the topic of the optimal multiplicand for supermajority voting rules 
collapses entirely into the topic of optimal voting rules themselves. Increasing the 
multiplicand upwards is in principle equivalent to altering the requisite supermajority 
upwards. So from the consequentialist standpoint the issue is parasitic on the familiar 
debate over the costs and benefits of supermajority rules,132 a topic that I need not rehash 
here. 
5. Transparency (of deliberation and voting) 
Among the most significant of Article I’s provisions regulating congressional 
procedure is the Journal Clause, which provides: 
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time 
publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require 
Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any 
question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the 
Journal.133 
This provision makes a number of fundamental design choices: for open voting rather 
than the secret ballot in Congress, at least as to some matters and on the request of a 
minority of legislators;134 for a default obligation to publish a journal of proceedings; and 
for an optional override of the transparency obligation in defined circumstances. Equally 
important are the design possibilities the clause rejects, and that are present in 
constitutions of other jurisdictions, such as constitutionally-mandated roll-call voting in 
legislative committees135 and a public right of physical access to legislative 
proceedings.136 To understand the stakes in all this, consider that throughout most of its 
history the English Parliament operated in secrecy and indeed punished attempts to 
publish records of its proceedings, that the Continental Congress initially closed its 
proceedings to outsiders and the constitutional convention did so throughout, and that 
                                                 
132 See McGinnis et al., supra note 6. 
133 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
134 Note that the Clause requires only one-fifth “of those present” to trigger a roll-call vote, not one-fifth of 
a quorum. But in the Senate (not the House), the practice is for the presiding officer to assume that a 
quorum is present until it is otherwise determined. Under that assumption, at least eleven Senators are 
required to join the roll-call request (one-fifth of a quorum of 51, rounding up), which may often be more 
than one-fifth of those actually present. Under senatorial courtesy, however, the leadership will often help 
members to arrange a desired roll-call. See Tiefer, supra note 39 at 530-33. 
135 See, e.g., Idaho Const., art. III, § 12; Iowa Const., art. III, § 10; La. Const., art. III, § 10; Mich. Const., 
art. IV, § 17; Mont. Const., art. V, § 11.2. 
136 See, e.g., Idaho Const., art. III, § 12; Iowa Const., art. III, § 10. 
Congressional Procedure 38 
 
even today most legislatures use secret ballots to select their officers while some, like the 
Italian Parliament, have until quite recently used them for final voting on legislation. The 
transparency of legislative deliberation and voting is in broad historical compass a recent 
design innovation, and a normatively controversial one, or so I shall argue. There are 
many good reasons for citizens and legislators to fear the effects of transparency on 
legislatures, and if we ultimately approve of the major thrust of the framers’ design 
choices along this margin—as I will—we should do so with full awareness of the 
institutional costs of those choices.  
I will break down this complex topic into three parts. The first sketches briefly the 
general tradeoffs inherent in legislative transparency; the second turns to the question of 
open versus secret voting, examining the purposes, scope and mechanics of the Journal 
Clause’s roll-call provision; and the third examines constitutional mandates that require 
roll-calls for certain votes (rather than merely allowing a set fraction of legislators to 
require them). 
Transparency, deliberation, and bargaining. At a general level, the institutional-
design tradeoffs inherent in transparency are well understood,137 although it is a daunting 
empirical task to specify how the relevant variables should be weighed in particular 
settings. Transparency reduces the cost to principals, such as citizens and voters, of 
monitoring their agents, such as legislators, who absent monitoring would divert 
resources to themselves or simply shirk their official duties. It is thus a favored recipe of 
democrats and good-government reformers who seek to reduce official corruption and to 
encourage regular attendance by legislators; we will see below that agents may even 
compete among themselves by offering principals institutional arrangements that provide 
for ever-greater transparency. 
This is all to the good as far as it goes, but transparency has important costs, in 
part precisely because of its democratizing effects; transparency changes official and 
legislative deliberation both for good and for ill. Without transparency, agents gain less 
from adopting positions that resonate with immediate popular passions, so transparency 
may exacerbate the effects of decisionmaking pathologies that sometimes grip mobilized 
publics.138 Transparency subjects public deliberation to reputational constraints: officials 
will stick to initial positions, once announced, for fear of appearing to vacillate or 
capitulate, and this effect will make deliberation more polarized and more partisan. The 
framers closed the Philadelphia convention to outsiders precisely to prevent initial 
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positions from hardening prematurely.139 The pressure to take a principled public stand 
also dampens explicit bargaining. 
Although anticorruption reformers count this as an unqualified good, it is in fact a 
qualified one. Bargains may represent corrupt deals by which agents enrich themselves at 
principals’ expense, but bargains also permit logrolls that may allow the legislative 
process to register the intensity of constituents’ preferences,140 and that help to appease 
policy losers by giving everyone something. Argument by reference to public principle, 
by contrast, is a hydraulic force that presses competing camps towards total victory or 
total defeat. Alternatively, transparency might simply drive decisionmaking underground, 
creating “deliberations” that are sham rituals while the real bargaining is conducted in 
less accessible and less formal venues, off the legislative floor or in closed committee 
markup sessions. 
So transparency is a mixed boon; not coincidentally, the historical and political 
record concerning legislative transparency presents a mixed picture. It is best to examine 
that record in the focused setting of particular constitutional questions, however. I shall 
begin with the baseline roll-call provisions applicable to ordinary voting, and then move 
to constitutionally mandated roll-calls for supermajority votes and other special 
circumstances.  
                                                 
139 See Elster, Arguing and Bargaining, supra, at 386: 
"At the Federal Convention, the sessions were closed and secret. As Madison said later: ‘Had the members 
committed themselves publicly at first, they would have afterwards supposed consistency required them to 
maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion no man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any 
longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was open to the force of argument.’"(citing 3 
Farrand at 479 (Madison as reported by Jared Sparks)). 
140 Logrolling may, of course, either permit socially beneficial trades or inflict socially harmful externalities 
on nontraders. Much depends on the details of the situation. “Today, no consensus exists in the normative 
public choice literature as to whether logrolling is on net welfare enhancing or welfare reducing, that is, 
whether logrolling constitutes a positive- or a negative-sum game.” Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 322 (1997).  
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(Open) voting and (secret) ballots. An intuitive and widely-held view is that, in a 
representative democracy, legislative voting must be publicized if citizen-voters are 
entitled or obliged to judge the performance of their representatives through periodic 
elections. In principal-agent terms, voters are the principals, legislators are the agents, 
and constitutional provisions that force agents to publicize their actions lower the 
monitoring costs that principals must incur, thereby making principals better off. Secret 
voting, on this view, confines principals to monitoring or judging outcomes alone, rather 
than both actions and outcomes. Rather than knowing both how elected representatives 
voted and what the political and economic outcomes of the votes were, voters are 
relegated to making reelection decisions solely on crude outcome-based proxies for 
successful government, such as the state of the economy or the voter’s personal finances 
at the time of election (or changes in either of those variables between the last election 
and the current one). Secret voting, it might be said, simply throws away information 
about legislators’ actions, or legislative inputs, that is of value to citizen-principals. 
The framers were quite aware of this principal-agent account, at least in its 
simplest outlines. Wilson argued in the convention that “[t]he people have a right to 
know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the 
Legislature to conceal their proceedings.” Formally, of course, the Journal Clause does 
allow a sufficient supermajority of the legislature (four-fifths plus one) to do just that, by 
refusing roll-call votes and by closing the legislative journals to public scrutiny (the latter 
simply on a majority vote).141 Yet we may surmise that the framers anticipated that 
competition between legislative factions would routinely produce public voting, as 
indeed it has done. Congress as an institution (although not voters) might be better off if 
all legislators, in both houses, could agree to enforce strict secrecy provisions, but 
competition among legislators and candidates produces socially beneficial transparency. 
As this last point emphasizes, where present or would-be legislators compete to 
achieve or retain office, modern accounts of the principal-agent relationship between 
voters and legislators have emphasized the benefits to legislator-agents themselves of 
reducing the costs of monitoring to principals.142 By offering contracts or arrangements 
that lower expected agency costs, either by reducing monitoring costs or in other ways, 
would-be agents induce principals to select them rather than others. They also increase 
the discretionary power with which principals will entrust them; the lower the costs of 
monitoring, the lower the risk that the agent will shirk or will divert power to his own 
ends rather than the principal’s, and the more power the agent will receive. These effects 
may of course operate through the mediation of political parties, rather than through the 
decisions of individual legislators. Parties will oppose secret voting to the extent that it 
                                                 
141 An ingenious, or diabolical, interpretation might emphasize that the roll-call provision merely requires 
that “the Yeas and Nays . . . shall, at the desire of be entered on the Journal” – and that a bare majority 
might subsequently decline to publish that “Part” of the Journal at all, deciding that “in their Judgment [it] 
require[s] Secrecy.” But this would essentially nullify the submajority one-fifth requirement for forcing a 
roll-call, in violation of standard canons of textual interpretation that bar interpreting one proviso to 
swallow or negate another. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as 
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994). So the better interpretation is that the roll-call provision trumps 
the secrecy option provided in the Clause; roll-calls must be published. To my knowledge neither House 
has ever refused to publish a roll-call vote. 
142 This paragraph and the next draw heavily upon the important account in Ferejohn, supra note ---  
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reduces their ability to monitor their members’ behavior and thus to credibly offer the 
electorate attractive policy packages. Consider the Italian Parliament, which uniquely 
among major liberal democracies had a regular, although complex, practice of secret 
voting until 1988, when the major political parties cooperated to abolish the practice as a 
means of asserting greater control over their own rank-and-file. 
In historical terms, we may interpret these points as suggesting two hypotheses: 
(1) that constitutional framers who wish to strengthen government power will propose 
constitutionally-mandated rules of governmental transparency to induce popular 
ratification; (2) that subsequent elections under the new constitution may bring about 
increased transparency through voluntary legislative action, as competing candidates and 
competing houses of the legislature bid for popular support by proposing institutional 
policies that reduce the voters’ monitoring costs. Both suggestions resonate with the 
historical evidence. As to the first, framers who advocated mandatory transparency of 
congressional deliberation and voting did so with the explicit recognition that encoding 
transparency in the constitutional bargain would help to dispel antifederalist concerns 
about the power of the new national government. Wilson, after arguing that the people 
had a right to know the actions of their legislative agents, added that “as this is a clause in 
the existing confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform 
with a pretext by which weak & suspicious minds would be easily mislead.” As to the 
second, the Senate’s decision to proceed behind closed doors for the first years of its 
existence, and to limit publication of its debates and votes, caused popular interest to 
center on the House; by 1801 the Senate was bidding for popular attention by opening its 
proceedings to the public. Subsequent developments in congressional procedure extend 
the story. Modern legislators have imposed transparency obligations on themselves, such 
as roll-call voting in congressional committees, with a view to encouraging attendance 
and dispelling popular suspicion of legislative corruption. And there is some empirical 
evidence suggesting that transparency obligations do at least hamper shirking by allowing 
opposing candidates to publicize incumbents’ attendance records.143  
So far the story is a happy or at least a straightforward one. We may complicate it 
by examining reasons that might give legislators good reason to fear the consequences of 
the transparency of legislative voting, and that might even cause their voter-principals to 
agree that public voting has important costs as well as benefits. From the legislators’ 
point of view, a major historical concern is that the executive branch will punish them for 
voting contrary to executive interests; the fear of monarchical influence animated 
Parliament’s elaborate attempts to maintain the secrecy of its proceedings during the 17th 
and 18th centuries. From the social standpoint, voter-principals might well approve of the 
legislature’s attempts to shield itself from executive-branch coercion. If the constitutional 
design seeks to minimize agency costs in part by creating institutional competition 
between branches, than executive aggrandizement and consequent domination of the 
legislature increases those costs.  
                                                 
143 See, e.g., David M. Olson, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 392-3 (1980); 
Ferejohn, supra note ---, at 139. Cf. Bruce Bender & John R. Lott, Jr., Legislator Voting and Shirking, 87 
PUB. CHOICE 67 (1996) (members in their final congressional terms have higher rates of absenteeism). 
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Yet legislative secrecy may itself be an unnecessarily costly response to the 
threat, because it also deprives voters of valuable information about their agents’ 
behavior. We might then understand the Speech and Debate Clause as an institutional-
design device that promises an alternative, and less costly, means of dampening executive 
aggrandizement. The Clause provides that “for any Speech and Debate in either House, 
[legislators] shall not be questioned in any other Place”;144 its historical purpose and most 
important function is to prevent the executive from using its control of prosecutorial 
power to punish or, better yet, threaten to punish noncompliant legislators for their words 
and actions. Whereas legislative secrecy protects legislators from executive coercion by 
constricting the executive’s information, the Speech and Debate Clause does so by 
constricting the executive’s opportunities, thus allowing voter-principals to use the 
information themselves while denying their executive agents the ability to use it 
coercively. The Clause is an incomplete substitute for secrecy, because the executive may 
use carrots as well as sticks, bribes as well as threats. Yet bribes are more expensive than 
threats, since a credible threat that deters its targets from disobedience is costless if the 
threatener never has to incur the costs of actually punishing those targets. Moreover, the 
constitutional design independently restricts the executive’s ability to bribe legislators 
along the most obvious margins. Consider the Emoluments Clause and the 
Incompatibility Clause, which together constrain, although they do not eliminate, the 
form of executive bribery most familiar to the framers, the offer of executive places or 
offices. The latter bars legislators from simultaneous service in the executive branch, 
while the former limits the President’s ability to appoint a legislator to a newly-created or 
newly-augmented executive posts during the legislator’s term of service. 
The fear of executive influence is a special case of a more general problem: open 
voting allows legislators to give third parties credible, because verifiable, commitments 
to vote in particular ways in return for bribes or in response to threats. With secret voting, 
by contrast, legislators cannot strike credible vote-selling bargains with the executive or 
interest groups, so the value of legislators’ votes to those groups declines.145 From the 
standpoint of voter-principals, the ability of legislators to credibly commit to sell votes to 
interest groups represents an agency cost insofar as the interest groups’ goals differ from 
the voters’.146 To be sure, even with secret voting interest groups may pay for outcomes 
rather than actions, offering legislators payments conditional on favorable legislative 
decisions. Yet interest groups can always pay for outcomes, even with open voting, so 
secret voting at least reduces the value of the legislator’s vote by removing one 
dimension over which bargains can be struck. And paying legislators for legislative 
outcomes is senseless unless interest groups can identify the swing or marginal 
legislators, who alone control outcomes anyway. But the interest groups’ ability to 
identify swing legislators is endogenous to the voting practice; with secret voting, any 
                                                 
144 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
145 Luban, supra note 94 at 187 (citing Sen. Robert Packwood). 
146 It is a separate question whether an open market in votes provides legislators themselves any benefit. As 
Ferejohn points out, ex ante competition between candidates for legislative office may dissipate the rents 
that legislators could otherwise obtain from vote-selling. Ferejohn, supra note --- at 140 n.6. This effect 
merely reallocates rents from legislators to their interest-group supporters; it does nothing to alleviate the 
agency loss to voters of legislative vote-selling, and indeed exacerbates it insofar as increasing expenditures 
on (rent-dissipating) competition between candidates is itself socially wasteful.  
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legislator may claim to be marginal in order to win an interest-group payment, but no 
such claims will be credible. 
There is an illuminating comparison here to voting in general elections, which 
was usually open during the 19th Century but is today almost invariably secret. The 
switch produced important debates between advocates of open voting, who thought that 
secrecy produced irresponsibility and corruption, and advocates of the secret ballot, who 
argued, among other things, that secrecy would diminish electoral corruption and 
extortion by rendering noncredible voters’ promises to sell votes to party bosses or local 
grandees for implicit payments, thereby reinforcing legal bans on explicit vote-selling. 
The response to this latter claim by advocates of open voting was and is that the sheer 
number of voters in general elections, and the infinitesimal chance of casting a decisive 
vote, ensure that the value of particular votes is too low to be worth buying; and no voter 
can deliver a bloc of votes as such. Whatever its merit, the argument emphasizes the far 
greater value of legislative votes, and the far more serious worry about third-party 
corruption in legislatures; after all, there are far fewer votes to buy in a legislature, and 
each has a far more direct effect on policy outcomes than general-election votes do.147 
Ignoring the loss of information to voters that legislative secrecy produces, we might 
even be surprised to find the pattern of secret voting in general elections and open voting 
in legislatures; the theory that produced the former militates even more strongly against 
the latter. 
To be sure, the principal-agent-problem is not the same in the two cases, if we see 
voters as agents for no one but themselves whose only task is to express a preference to 
be aggregated socially. But then it takes a complex collective-action account to explain 
the ordinary legal ban on vote-selling.148 On a more elevated but also more 
straightforward account, we may see voters as agents for all citizens, and see elections as 
aggregating voters’ judgments about the social good rather than their preferences.149 On 
this view, to allow voters to sell their judgments to third parties inflicts the same type of 
agency cost on society that legislative vote-selling inflicts on the electorate. This view 
straightforwardly justifies both the ban on explicit vote-selling and the accompanying 
practice of the secret ballot. 
The upshot of these points is that open voting has cross-cutting or ambiguous 
effects on voters’ control of their legislative agents. On one hand, a switch from secret to 
                                                 
147 “Consider some of the differences between a legislature and the populace: (1) Votes are cast by secret 
ballots in direct democracy, not so in legislatures. So, votes can hardly be bought and sold since there is no 
chance of adequate policing; (2) voters are not "repeat players" in the sense that they interact with one 
another on a statewide level such that their allegiances and behavior can be watched by others; (3) voters 
have no continuing oversight mechanisms to enable them to secure influence over interest groups, regulated 
industries or others; their only redress is an initiative that is considered at the next appropriate election.” 
Daniel Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside-Out: Intrastate Aspects of Interstate Regulatory Competition, 
14 YALE J. REG. 149 (1996). 
148 See Russell Hardin, Morality Within the Limits of Reason (Chicago, 1988); Saul Levmore, Voting With 
Intensity, 53 Stan L Rev 111 (2000). 
149 See Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, Rousseau’s General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective, 82 
American Political Science Review 567-76 (1988); Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Majorities: Rousseau 
Revisited, in NOMOS XXXII: Majorities and Minorities 44 (John W. Vhapman & Alan Wertheimer eds. 
1990). 
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open voting reduces agency costs by reducing the voters’ costs of monitoring their 
legislative agents. On the other hand, a switch from secret to open voting also creates an 
agency cost by creating an open market for legislative votes, allowing interest groups to 
divert legislators from voters’ goals. These two variables move in opposite directions, so 
the institutional-design question is how the two costs net out. The question is empirical, 
not a priori, so if our task is to evaluate Article I’s mandate for public roll-call voting 
from the standpoint of normative institutional design we should take comfort in the fact 
that open voting is ubiquitous in the representative assemblies of liberal democracies, 
often by constitutional prescription. If there is even a weak tendency for institutions, 
specifically constitutions, to evolve towards rules that minimize agency costs, we should 
infer from this strong uniformity that the loss of information to voters produced by 
secrecy outweighs the agency costs produced by an open market in legislative votes. 
This is not to say, however, that we should uncritically approve of the roll-call 
provisions in the Journal Clause. If the empirical regularity of open voting in legislatures 
suggests that the Clause does not go too far, we might believe, on precisely the same 
grounds, that the Clause does not go far enough. Although the constitutional text provides 
for roll-call voting on “any question,” early interpretations settled that the rule extends 
only to final votes on enactments, not to voting in standing or ad hoc committees, even 
the Committee of the Whole that the House uses to process amendments.150 Many state 
and foreign constitutions, however, mandate (or permit a small minority to require) roll-
call voting in committee as well as on floor passage.151 Given the major 19th-century shift 
that made congressional committees, rather than the floor, the dominant locus of 
legislative dealmaking, we might wish ex post that the federal Constitution had 
indisputably provided the same thing. More recent Congresses have attained the same 
result by voluntary rulemaking, but instead of taking this to suggest that an updated 
interpretation of the Clause is unnecessary, we might equally take it to suggest that an 
updated interpretation would not prove infeasibly disruptive. On both textual and 
functional grounds, then, the prevailing interpretation of Article I’s roll-call provisions is 
underinclusive; Congress should recognize a constitutional, not merely self-imposed, 
obligation to reinterpret the Journal Clause to cover voting in all legislative fora. 
Mandatory roll-call voting. A striking empirical regularity across state 
constitutions is that they frequently provide for constitutionally mandated roll-calls—in 
contrast to roll-calls that, as with the Journal Clause, must be triggered by a set fraction of 
legislators . State constitutions typically mandate roll-call voting for the final passage of 
any bill152 and for supermajority votes.153 Although by tradition the Senate always uses 
roll-calls to vote on treaties, the Constitution expressly mandates roll calls in one case 
only: where the Houses vote by two-thirds supermajority to override a presidential veto. 
                                                 
150 See Walter J. Oleszek, CRS Report for Congress, HOUSE VOTING PROCEDURES: FORMS AND 
REQUIREMENTS (1998). 
151 See, e.g., Ark. Const., art. IV, § 12; Fla. Const., art. III, § 4(c); Ga. Const., art. IV, § 5.6; Ill. Const., art. 
IV, § 8(c); Md. Const., art. III, § 22.; N.C. Const., art. II, § 19; Wisc. Const., art. IV, § 20. 
152 See, e.g., Alaska Const., art. II, § 14; Del. Const., art. II, § 10; Ill. Const., art. IV, § 8(c); La. Const., art. 
III, § 10; Mich. Const., art. IV, § 18; Minn. Const., art. IV, § 15; Mont. Const., art. V, § 11, cl. 2. 
153 See, e.g., Ga. Const., art. IV, § 5, cl. 6; Kan. Const., art. II, § 10; Tenn. Const., art. III, § 21; Va. Const., 
art. III, § 10. 
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“In all such Cases,” the provision runs, “the Vote of both Houses shall be determined by 
yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be 
entered on the Journal of each House respectively.”154 The difference between mandates 
and trigger provisions at first seems less than dramatic, at least where the fraction needed 
to rigger a roll-call is as small as the Journal Clause’s one-fifth, but the striking 
consequence of such provisions is that even unanimous consent cannot dispense with the 
need for a roll-call, something that is very rare for constitutional transparency rules. 
On the account offered here, it is straightforward to evaluate the marginal effect 
of such provisions, over and above the baseline roll-call rules. The mandate for roll-call 
voting increases the information available to citizens about legislators’ behavior on the 
most consequential votes, those involving final passage and the extraordinary 
circumstances in which supermajority voting is required. Because the stakes are so high 
in such situations, it might be a plausible concern that even legislators who otherwise 
compete to offer transparency to constituents would develop mechanisms to overcome 
their collective-action problems and collude to prevent the roll-call procedure from being 
triggered. Alternatively (although this point is compatible with the last one), it might be 
thought that citizen-principals should most suspect that their legislator-agents have fallen 
prey to deliberative pathologies, or are engaging in self-dealing, precisely when those 
agents are unanimous, or sufficiently near unanimous that even the small number of votes 
needed to trigger a roll-call cannot be found. The ambiguity of unanimity is always with 
us. Unanimity might suggest, along the lines suggested by the Condorcet jury theorem, 
that there is a right answer and everyone has figured it out. It might also suggest that a 
legislative mob is stampeding towards a dubious policy, or that a legislative gang has 
passed out sufficient side payments to all participants. 
The flip side of the coin, of course, is that the mandated transparency also 
enhances the monitoring of bargains between legislators and other actors. The mandated 
roll-call on veto override votes probably enhances presidential power on net, by 
permitting the President to strike marginally-more enforceable bargains in anticipation of 
veto showdowns, and this might or might not be thought positive taken by itself. But the 
magnitude of this effect is probably rather small, and the widespread and consistent use 
of roll-call mandates by state constitutions suggests that the background evolutionary or 
institutional pressure to monitor supermajority votes and final-passage votes more closely 
than other votes ought to be deemed more important than a loss of legislative autonomy 
that is marginal in both the colloquial and formal senses. By the same logic, however, it 
is plausible to criticize the Journal Clause yet again as being too narrow: a mandated roll-
call vote on all bills up for final passage would incorporate what is plausibly a valuable 
state-level innovation. 
                                                 
154 The literal-minded will note that this provision appears to draw a distinction between “yea and nay” 
votes, on the one hand, and votes that match votes with the names of particular legislators, on the other – 
perhaps suggesting that the yea-and-nay voting required by the Journal Clause requires only a formal count 
of those supporting and those opposed (in contrast to methods like voice voting and division voting, which 
allow the speaker or presiding officer to judge the result based on an imprecise estimate of which side has 
the majority. In congressional tradition, however, this distinction has never been drawn; roll-call voting 
always matches votes with names. See Oleszek, House Voting Procedures, supra note 103; Tiefer, supra 
note 39 at 536-37. 
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6. The Origination Clause 
The Origination Clause provides that “[a]ll Bills for raising revenue shall 
originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with 
Amendments as on other Bills.”155 The Clause presents a variety of important historical 
issues. We have seen that the convention was riven by struggles over the Clause, a 
question intertwined with the all-important question of the basis of representation in the 
Senate. The principal rationale for origination restrictions was typically that the upper 
house, where hereditary (as in England) or elected on a geographic rather than 
proportional basis (as in the Senate) was remote from or unrepresentative of “the people,” 
a rationale that would disappear if the Senate were elected on a proportional basis. 
Accordingly Pinkney initially proclaimed the question of the Origination Clause 
“premature[:] If the Senate [should] be formed on the same proportional representation as 
it stands at present, they [should] have equal power [i.e. to originate money bills,] 
otherwise if a different principle [should] be introduced.”156 After much maneuvering the 
Clause was inserted as compensation to large states in consideration for their 
acquiescence in the state-based, rather than proportional, composition of the Senate. I 
shall not explore this background in any more detail,157 however, as my project is not to 
trace the provenance of the constitutional law of congressional procedure, but to evaluate 
it prescriptively. 
In the origination setting, the framers faced a superficially simple menu of design 
choices: to have no origination restriction, to create a category of bills subject to 
exclusive House origination with no Senate amendments permitted (remitting the Senate 
to an up-or-down vote), or to make House origination exclusive while permitting Senate 
amendments. The no-amendment regime roughly describes the traditional practice of 
Parliament, in which the Lords were not permitted to amend fiscal measures originating 
in the Commons, while the regime permitting amendments had been adopted in several 
state constitutions.158 The framers were divided on the question whether the various 
possible versions of the Clause would have any effects at all, and if so what those effects 
would be. I shall suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Clause indeed has 
effects, and that they are largely beneficial from Congress’ point of view—so much so 
that exclusive privileges of origination tend to evolve endogenously. The best criticism of 
the Clause, then, is not that it is ineffectual or a nullity, but instead that (putting aside the 
need to make the proposed constitution acceptable to the ratifiers) it was unnecessary for 
the convention to constitutionalize the Clause; a similar norm might well have evolved in 
its absence. 
 More than a few framers argued that the third option, an origination clause with 
Senate amendment power, would have no effect at all. James Wilson put the argument 
metaphorically: 
                                                 
155 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7. 
156 1 Farrand, supra note --- at 234 
157 For an full account, see Medina, infra. 
158 See, e.g., Md. Const., art. III, § 27(a); Nev. Const., art. IV, § 16; N.H. Const., art. II, § 19; N.J. Const., 
art. IV, § 6.1; N.Y. Const., art. III, § 12; Ohio Const., art. II, §15. 
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With regard to the pursestrings, it was to be observed that the purse was to 
have two strings, one of which was in the hands of the H[ouse] of 
Rep[resentatives], the other in those of the Senate. Both houses must concur 
in untying, and of what importance could it be which untied first, which 
last.159 
The proposal that Wilson was addressing would have required House origination of both 
revenue bills and appropriations bills, while the enacted version of the Clause limits the 
restriction to revenue bills alone, so the metaphor of pursestrings may be slightly 
misleading; I shall take up the question of appropriations bills below. Nonetheless 
Wilson’s basic point is an important one. The Senate can, and not infrequently has, 
simply stricken out the whole substance of a bill enacted by the House and inserted its 
own proposal (as an “amendment”). The resulting bill, if approved by the subsequent 
conference committee, will have nominally originated in the House, but will in substance 
have originated in the Senate;160 indeed some major tax-reform legislation, such as the 
reworking of the tax code in 1986, has just this provenance.161 So either origination 
regime—the one barring amendments and the one permitting them—in effect allows the 
Senate to make counteroffers, and it is unclear in what respect the House’s exclusive 
power to originate revenue bills makes any difference. 162 
But this argument is overblown. Even where counteroffers are permitted, in the 
form of de jure or de facto amendments, standard bargaining models suggest that the 
first-mover may obtain a disproportionate share of the gains. The essential intuition is 
that the first player will benefit from its ability to make an initial offer that gives the 
second player only an iota more than the second player would obtain at the end of the 
sequence of offers and responses; the second player can do no better than to accept.163 To 
be sure, this advantage is of uncertain magnitude, and much depends on the precise 
specifications of the model. The more quickly the value of obtaining agreement later 
(rather than now) declines, the greater the first-mover advantage is,164 but the relative 
impatience of the players—the rate at which they discount future gains—is also a critical 
factor,165 and of course either House may anticipate future or unrelated negotiations and 
thus decide to invest in a reputation for obstinacy. Informally, however, softer 
considerations support the idea that the House gains something from its origination 
privilege. Even where the Senate enjoys amendment power, the House might enjoy an 
                                                 
159 2 Farrand, supra note --- at 275. 
160 Id. at 277. 
161 This point is emphasized by the important institutional detail that most current tax legislation is 
reviewed by the expert staff of the standing Joint Committee on Taxation before funneling through House 
Ways and Means or the Senate Finance Committee. 
162 An unexplored issue, tangential to the discussion in text, is the effect of the Clause on tax-related 
treaties. The Clause might bar the President and Senate from creating a self-executing agreement with 
foreign nations to change revenue rules, as the Clause requires the House to initiate the statutory changes 
needed to bring the treaty into force. Thanks to Julie Roin for this point. 
163 See Bruce Lyons, “Bargaining,” in Shaun Hargreaves Heap et al., THE THEORY OF CHOICE 136-37 
(1992). 
164 See id. at 136, 141; Avinash Dixit & Susan Skeath, GAMES OF STRATEGY 531-41 (1999). 
165 If the players have equal discount rates, the first-mover retains an advantage. If the second-mover 
discounts less steeply than the first, however, that advantage may dissipate or even be reversed, depending 
on the players’ specified traits. See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 161 at 537-38. 
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intangible but real form of first-mover advantage from its ability to set the policy agenda 
in ways that structure both legislative and political debate. The question is empirical, and 
the literature suggests that there is indeed an appreciable first-mover advantage in the 
legislative game.166  
 A related argument suggests, more broadly, that the Clause is a nullity because 
any origination restriction can be circumvented through intercameral contracting, whether 
or not the Clause permits Senate amendments. At the convention, several delegates 
advanced some version of the following argument of Madison’s: 
Experience proved that it [“the exclusive privilege of originating money 
bills”] had no effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished a bill to be 
originated, they might surely find some member from some of the same 
States in the lower branch who would originate it. The restriction as to 
amendment was as of little consequence. Amendments could be handed 
privately by the Senate to members in the other house.167 
In modern terms, the Origination Clause may be transacted around, at low cost, by the 
two Houses,168 whose repeat-play relationship has produced elaborate institutions for 
intercameral bargaining (such as conference committees and the Joint Tax Committee). 
But this Coasean analysis ignores the distributive effect of the initial specification of 
constitutional entitlements. Even if the same revenue levels are produced with or without 
the Clause, the House’s ability to demand a payment for the renunciation of its 
origination privilege with respect to particular bills will skew the distribution of political 
benefits between House and Senate in the House’s favor, relative to a world with no 
Origination Clause at all.169 The flawed assumption underlying the argument must be that 
there is in effect no constitutionally-specified entitlement to begin with, because there is 
                                                 
166 “The chamber that acts first on a bill tends to have the greatest impact on the content of a bill.” Gerald S. 
Strom and Barry Rundquist, A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences, 71 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 448, 451 (1977); see also Donald A. Gross, House-Senate Conference Committees: A Comparative-
State Perspective, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 769 (1980) and Dennis S. Ippolito, House-Senate Budget 
Conferences: Institutional and Strategic Advantages, 11 AM. POL. Q. 71 (1983).  
167 2 Farrand, supra note --- at 273. 
168 See Donald Wittman, “The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract,” in Bernard Grofman and 
Donald Witman, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 75-76 (1989). 
169 The point here is not, of course, that the outcomes in either case would be socially efficient. As one 
possible source of inefficiency among many, note that the Origination Clause will at the margins increase 
the inefficiency of redistributive measures by Congress. Under certain assumptions, it can be shown that 
redistribution is more efficiently handled through taxation than through regulation. Compare Louis Kaplow 
and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) with Chris Sanchirico, Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: 
A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000). But if there is a cost to the Senate in making a side 
payment to the House (to buy off its constitutional objection) whenever the Senate wishes to redistribute by 
originating a revenue bill, then the Senate will shift marginally from redistributive revenue projects to less-
efficient regulatory projects, and the total output of Congress will contain more regulation and less taxation 
(holding constant overall redistribution) than in a regime with the revenue-origination rule. 
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no external mechanism for enforcing the Clause. This assumption is, under the Supreme 
Court’s current doctrine, simply false; the Clause is fully justiciable.170 
 Indeed, the best analysis of the Clause’s behavioral effects flips all of these 
arguments on their head. Far from being ineffectual, origination restrictions of greater or 
lesser formality may be predictable or inevitable, in the sense that they tend to evolve 
endogenously as norms governing the behavior of bicameral legislatures. Here the basic 
intuition is that a lower chamber with more members, such as the House, may obtain 
policy-relevant information at lower cost than an upper chamber with fewer members, 
such as the Senate. Over time, the two Houses may attain an equilibrium arrangement in 
which the lower House specializes in information in return for the distributive advantage 
of having the first move. The House receives a larger share of the larger pie, but the 
Senate too benefits on net from the House’s informational expertise. 171  
Obviously many other variables and forces may vitiate or drown out this effect; it 
is strongest, for example, when the two Houses are dominated by the same political party 
(and thus have similar preferences). But the quasi-constitutional traditions surrounding 
appropriations legislation provide a fine confirmatory example of the general model. The 
convention, as we have seen, rejected a proposal to include appropriations measures in 
the Origination Clause. Nonetheless a longstanding norm has evolved within Congress to 
the effect that the House has the exclusive prerogative of initiating appropriations 
measures.172 Much about this norm is contested, and its scope and weight are uncertain; 
the Senate takes it to be a subconstitutional “custom” rather than a tradition of 
constitutional stature; the House insists that the “immemorial practice” has been 
constitutionalized by prescription.173 But the norm’s persistence in the face of uncertainty 
about its precise constitutional status testifies to the persistent benefits of cameral 
specialization. 
                                                 
170 The Supreme Court has never invalidated a statute on Origination Clause grounds. But the Court has 
consistently said that the Clause is justiciable, and it has several times considered Origination Clause 
challenges on the merits, in each case finding that the statute under review was not a “Bill for raising 
revenue” within the meaning of the Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990); 
Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897). On one account, the Court has strained to deny that the 
challenged statutes were revenue measures, presumably in order to avoid the difficult questions of judicial 
capacity that would be posed by any effort to determine whether a bill originated in the House or Senate. 
See Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F.135, 141 (S.D. N.Y. 1915), appeal dismissed mem., 242 U.S. 654 (1916) 
(invalidating a federal statute under the Origination Clause, and opining that “[the Supreme Court] 
sometimes required a good deal of mental strain to demonstrate that some piece of legislation originating in 
a Senate was not a ‘bill for raising revenue’”). Part of the historical picture, however, was the possibility 
that the enrolled-bill rule of Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), might bar the Court from 
looking behind Congress’ formal certification of a bill’s House of origin. The Court firmly rejected the 
enrolled-bill rule in Munoz-Flores, saying that the rule does not apply when “a constitutional provision is 
implicated.” See 495 U.S. at 391 n.4. 
171 See James Rogers, Bicameral Sequence: Theory and State Legislative Evidence, 42 AM. J. 
POLI. SCI. 1025 (1998). 
172 James V. Saturno, THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: INTERPRETATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT, CRS Report for Congress 1 (2002). 
173 See J. Michael Medina, The Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Comparative Survey, 
23 TULSA L.J. 165, 186-87 (1987). 
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The upshot, then, is that origination privileges may often evolve endogenously. 
While this point undermines the claim that origination restrictions are ineffectual, it does 
suggest a different criticism of the Clause: it may have been unnecessary to 
constitutionalize the revenue-origination privilege in the first place. The large states, like 
North Carolina, that demanded the Clause as compensation for accepting an equal basis 
of representation in the Senate might have been better off with a different form of side-
payment. It is true, however, that in an ex post sense the social harm of the convention’s 
normatively questionable decision to constitutionalize the Clause has been quite small; in 
this sense the Clause’s critics are pointed in the right direction, albeit for the wrong 
reasons. 
7. Cameral Autonomy and Congressional Rulemaking 
 May Congress enact an ordinary statute, presented to the President, that prescribes 
binding internal rules for the houses of Congress acting separately? An internal rule 
means, as always, a rule that could otherwise have been enacted by the houses alone 
under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. A notable and little-explored feature of the 
public-law landscape is the prevalence of statutory law that bears on internal 
congressional procedure. Consider the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act,174 which 
barred consideration by either House of Congress of certain resolutions concerning 
energy policy, or the recent Congressional Review Act,175 which establishes special 
internal legislative procedures for disapproving proposed agency regulations.  
 It is critical, however, that Congress often inserts a proviso that subjects the 
statute to override by a subsequent internal legislative rule of either House, in the 
ordinary course.176 These qualifiers create a positive puzzle. Rule-prescribing statutes that 
contain such a proviso are essentially hortatory or directory; they have no legal effect on 
the rule-prescribing power of the houses. Why then does Congress enact the underlying 
statute in the first place? An obvious possibility is that the statute serves a coordinating 
function between the two houses, announcing focal points (such as numerical deadlines) 
so that legislators from one house may shape their behavior in conjunction with 
legislators from the other. Yet the aim of coordination could be equally well served by a 
concurrent resolution, not presented to the President. Why use the ordinary statutory 
form, exposing internal congressional business to executive involvement and a potential 
veto? 
A more plausible conjecture is simply that the procedural alternative to such 
statutes is unappealing.177 Instead of enacting a statute that contains both substantive 
policy directives and (hortatory) internal rules, Congress might split the substantive 
questions from the procedural ones, enacting the former in the ordinary manner and 
                                                 
174 15 U.S.C. §719 et seq.; see also Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that 
alleged violations of the Act’s procedural requirements are nonjusticiable). 
175 5 U.S.C. §801 et seq. 
176 See, e.g., Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §802(g)(2): “This section is enacted by Congress . . . with 
full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other 
rule of that House.” 
177 Thanks to Elizabeth Garrett for this conjecture. 
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enacting the latter through each House’s separate rulemaking process. Such a course of 
action, however, requires at least two votes (in each House) rather than one, and thus 
creates more opportunities for strategic behavior. By bundling substantive with 
procedural provisions, the rule-prescribing statute achieves the effect of an omnibus bill, 
allowing enforceable deals to be struck where the alternative of sequential voting would 
permit defection in later votes. Moreover, in both the House and Senate mid-session rule 
changes are difficult to accomplish; by tacking what is in effect a rule change to a statute 
already under consideration, each House conserves agenda time and minimizes decision 
costs. 
As to the normative questions: the first task is to set the constitutional baseline. 
Are genuine rule-prescribing statutes, lacking the typical proviso, valid or invalid under 
the current constitution rightly understood? An example is the Electoral Count Act, 
which “puts strict time limits on the electoral count: when the two Houses separate to 
debate an objection to an electoral vote, each Member of each House may only speak 
once on the objection for a maximum of five minutes, and total debate in each House is 
limited to two hours.”178 Here, in contrast to statutes whose prescription of internal rules 
is merely hortatory, the positive value of the enactment is easy to understand. First, the 
power to make binding rules in advance of particular controversies allows legislators to 
proceed as though behind a veil of ignorance, or uncertainty, and thus helps to ensure the 
impartiality of the resulting rules. The procedures mandated by the Electoral Count Act 
fit this picture nicely; much better to settle the management of contested presidential 
elections before competing parties and factions know who the candidates will be. Where 
binding statutory prescription of internal rules is impossible, rules are always subject to 
ex post adjustment when the substantive valence of the rules has become apparent. 
Second, statutes of this sort entrench procedural rules as against future Houses, 
and this is a policy instrument with potential value to both the enacting Congress and 
later congresses. Entrenchment permits credible commitments to be made, both among 
legislators and between legislators and outside actors, such as the executive, constituents, 
or foreign nations, in situations where a nonentrenched rule would be exposed to 
subsequent opportunistic change by one party to the deal. By making commitment 
possible, entrenchment allows all concerned to strike a range of bargains that are 
otherwise unattainable. On this view, the constitutional authority for the rule-prescribing 
component of these statutes is, simply, whatever substantive legislative power authorizes 
the statute, in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause.179  
One constitutional objection to such statutes is the hoary anti-entrenchment 
maxim that one legislature may not bind its successors. That objection is, however, 
untenable, for reasons explained at length elsewhere.180 But there are other, more 
                                                 
178 Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653 (2001). The author 
concludes that this provision violates the Rules of Proceedings Clause. 
179 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 155, 160 
n.31 (1995); see also Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, (D.C. Cir. 1994) (suggesting, in dictum, that a 
procedural rule created by statute would “trump any authority of the House to change its rules unilaterally 
to grant that power.”). 
180 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 
(2002). For a contrary view, see McGinnis & Rappaport, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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formidable objections as well. First, it is plausibly the best reading of the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause that the power of each House to “determine the rules of its 
proceedings” is exclusive as well as permissive; the Clause, that is, not only authorizes 
internal one-house rulemaking, but also bars internal rulemaking through other 
instruments. (Note that this objection is entirely distinct from the anti-entrenchment 
objection; the latter concerns the legal authority of Houses over time, while the former 
addresses the question of which legal instruments—rulemaking alone, or both rules and 
statutes—a given House can use to make internal rules). On this view, the claim that the 
"Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to carry into execution its own 
powers, including the rule-making powers of both Houses"181 is mistaken; the rule-
making powers of the Houses taken separately are not powers of Congress as a joint 
body, and thus cannot be exercised by statute. A second important objection sounds in the 
separation of powers; quite apart from the Rules of Proceedings Clause, it might be said 
that presidential involvement in Congress’ internal rulemaking poses an unacceptable risk 
of executive invasion of core legislative functions. On this view, Congress might be able 
to enact rules by concurrent resolution,182 but not by statutes subject to presentment. 
If statutes that prescribe binding internal rules are unconstitutional, is this good 
constitutional design? Probably not. In these settings the Constitution deprives Congress 
of its first-choice instrument, thereby imposing discernible costs for uncertain benefits. 
The costs are the inability of earlier Congresses to commit to future rules behind the veil 
of ignorance, and the foregone bargains made possible by entrenching instruments that 
codify binding commitments. The benefits of prohibiting Congress from seizing such 
opportunities are obscure. The bare insistence on cameral autonomy—the insistence that 
each House simply must make rules to govern itself and itself alone—just restates the 
conclusion, rather than explaining it. After all, an instrument that prescribes binding 
internal rules is simply another policy tool at Congress’ disposal. It is hard to see, in 
general, why such an instrument should be thought any more dangerous, or more 
susceptible to abuse, than a myriad other instruments that Congress uses routinely, such 
as the many varieties of taxation, spending, and delegation. The structural problem of 
presidential encroachment, if it is one, might be obviated by providing a constitutional 
mechanism for binding concurrent resolutions in areas also subject to the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause. All in all, it is a flaw in the current Constitution that, correctly 
interpreted, it bars Congress as an institution from prescribing internal rules binding on 
the Houses taken separately.  
8. “Missing” Provisions 
Finally, I shall briefly analyze some legislative-procedure rules that might, with 
the benefit of two centuries of hindsight, be described as “missing” from the federal 
constitution. These are provisions that have, since the founding era, come into wide use 
in other jurisdictions’ constitutions. I shall make no attempt at a comprehensive survey of 
the terrain, not shall I discuss important state constitutional innovations that are 
                                                 
181 Calabresi, supra note 125. 
182 The Kansas constitution creates such a mechanism; it allows the two legislative houses to adopt joint 
rules on certain matters, and to provide the “manner” in which those rule may be changed in the future. 
Kans. Const., art. II, § 12. 
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substantive rather than procedural in my sense. Examples in this last category are single-
subject rules, which typically prohibit enactments that contain unrelated provisions, and 
prohibitions on special or local bills, which bar enactments for the benefit of 
geographically or socially confined interests, as opposed to the public interest. In both 
cases, the prohibitions look to the enactment’s content and substance, ruling out certain 
legislative outcomes, rather than addressing the mode of the bill’s enactment; in this 
respect they are closely analogous to the federal equal protection clause. The examples I 
shall discuss here, by contrast, are genuinely procedural, in that a bill of given content 
may either satisfy or violate them in light of the history of its passage through the 
legislature.  
Three-reading rules. A striking feature of the legislative procedure mandated by 
state and foreign constitutions is the widespread presence of “three-reading rules.” Such 
rules typically require that “[n]o bill shall become a law unless the same shall have been 
read on three several days in each house previous to the final vote thereon.”183 In most 
jurisdictions, however, the three-reading requirement may be overridden by a 
supermajority vote, at least in cases of “urgency.”184 In the national Congress, each 
House early adopted three-reading rules; although the Senate rules required three 
readings on three different days, and the Senate retains its rule today, the House rules 
currently allow a bill to be read three times and enacted all in a single legislative day.185 
Bentham’s argument for three-reading rules, which is the standard argument, 
illustrates their justifications and their characteristic problems. Bentham argues, chiefly, 
that the three-reading rule operates as a self-binding mechanism that allows the 
legislature to guard against the consequences of its own future passions, myopia, or herd 
behavior. By requiring that bills be read and debated on successive days, the legislature 
may anticipate and forestall future occasions on which it will be seized by deliberative 
pathologies. “The more susceptible a people are of excitement and being led astray, so 
much the more ought they to place themselves under the protection of forms which 
impose the necessity of reflection, and prevent surprises.”186 
Bentham is aware of the most obvious counterargument: delay, reflection and 
deliberation amount to inaction, and inaction produces opportunity costs. By preventing 
legislators from acting in a passionate frenzy, the three-reading-requirement minimizes 
the risk of false positives—occasions when the legislature should not have acted but did. 
Yet the requirement also increases the risk of false negatives—occasions when the 
legislature should have acted expeditiously, yet, stewing in its own deliberative maturity, 
failed to do so. Bentham responds as follows: “It may be objected, that this plan [the 
three-reading requirement] occasions great delays, and that circumstances may 
imperiously require that a law should be passed with rapidity. To this it may be replied, 
                                                 
183 For state constitutional provisions, see Idaho Const., art. III, § 15; Ind. Const., art. IV, § 18; S.C. Const., 
art. III, § 18; Alab. Const., art. III, §63; Col. Const., art. V, § 22. For foreign constitutional provisions, see 
Constitution of France, art. 45-46 (2-reading requirement). 
184 See, e.g., Alaska Const., art. II, § 14; Col. Const., art. V, § 22; Fla. Const., art. III, § 7, Md. Const., art. 
III, §27(a); Or. Const., art. IV, § 19; W. Va. Const., art. VI, § 29. 
185 House Rule VXI, cl. 8; Senate Rule XIV, cl. 2. 
186 Bentham, supra note --- at 131. 
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that in cases of necessity the Houses of Parliament can suspend their usual orders, and 
that a bill may be made to pass through all its stages in both houses in one day.”187 But 
this view collapses under its own weight unless the three-reading rule is entrenched, 
perhaps by constitutionalization. Without entrenchment, the very same decisionmaking 
pathologies that produce hasty and ill-considered substantive legislation will produce 
hasty and ill-considered suspensions of the three-reading rule. Bentham has overlooked 
that nonentrenched procedural rules are endogenous products of the legislature, and are 
thus subject to the control of the same majorities that Bentham seeks to restrain. 
So the key design problem here is that three-reading rules must be 
constitutionalized or otherwise entrenched to achieve their intended effects. The 
necessary entrenchment of three-reading requirements might be constitutional or cameral, 
and, if it is cameral, either formal or informal. In many states, as we have seen, three-
reading requirements are formally entrenched in the constitution. In the Senate the 
requirement is cameral only, but it is also formal. A motion to change or suspend the 
Senate rules, including the three-reading rule, is subject to filibuster and thus requires 60 
votes to attain cloture; and the cloture rule is itself formally entrenched.188 (Here the 
Senate is using a supermajority rule to protect its ordinary processes; I shall return to the 
relationship between three-reading rules and supermajority rules momentarily). In the 
House, however, the barriers are more porous. We have seen that the current House rules 
allow all required readings to occur in a single day, and even the requirement of three 
readings can itself be dispensed with. Although there is an appreciable de facto cost to 
changing the House rules after their biannual readoption at the beginning of a new 
Congress, there is no formal barrier to intrasession rule changes or, more commonly, 
suspensions by simple majority.189 We might, then, plausibly see it as a defect in the 
federal constitutional law of legislative procedure that it failed to codify and entrench the 
three-reading requirement, a device that was well known to the framers from 
parliamentary practice, and that they in fact adopted, in slightly diluted form, to govern 
the business of the convention itself.190 
The entrenchment of three-reading requirements, however, reanimates the 
concern that deliberative delay will produce costly inaction. Most states have sensibly 
attempted to maximize the net benefits of three-reading requirements through design 
devices that sort occasions for swift action, on the one hand, from legislative frenzies on 
the other. A common technique is to use supermajority requirements, sometimes 
combined with a substantive trigger that permits the supermajority override only in case 
of “emergency” or “urgency.” It is tempting to condemn such provisions on the ground 
that supermajority rules allow legislative minorities to hold out for side payments, and 
that the existence of an emergency will exacerbate this concern, forcing the legislative 
                                                 
187 Bentham, supra note --- at 130-131. 
188 See Posner and Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment, supra note 126 at 1694-95.  
189 Enactment of a bill using the suspension procedures of House Rule XXVII does require a two-thirds 
vote. See House Rule XXVII, § 1. However, “[I]f a suspension motion fails to receive the required two-
thirds vote, the House can consider the bill in question again and under procedures that require only a 
simple majority vote to pass it.” Stanley Bach, CRS Report for Congress, SUSPENSION OF THE RULES IN THE 
HOUSE: PRINCIPAL FEATURES (1998). 
190 1 Farrand, supra note 29 at 9; Robert Luce, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES AND 
THE COURSE OF BUSINESS IN THE FRAMING OF STATUTES 207 (1922). 
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majority to acquiesce in the minority’s extortionate demands. Yet a holdout threat will 
not be credible under such circumstances.191 If a genuine emergency is at hand, so that 
the result of inaction will be worse for all concerned, including the minority, than will 
passage of the necessary legislation without side payments, then the minority can do no 
better than to acquiesce. The majority, knowing this, will ignore the minority’s demands 
entirely, and the necessary supermajority will support the bill even without payments. 
Temporal restrictions on proposed legislation. In the national House and Senate 
bills may be introduced at any time during the legislative session, and the Constitution 
contains no restrictions on this practice. Many state constitutions, by contrast, restrict the 
period during which bills may be introduced, typically by counting either forward or 
backward from the beginning or end of the session. Thus the Washington Constitution 
prescribes that “[n]o bill shall be considered in either house unless the time of its 
introduction shall have been at least ten days before the final adjournment of the 
legislature,”192 subject to a supermajority override; while the Missouri Constitution bars 
nonappropriations bills from being introduced “after the sixtieth legislative day,”193 
subject to an override by simple majority. In some states the class of legislation subject to 
timing requirements is more narrow—appropriations bills, or bills relating to official 
salaries—but most states that have timing restrictions parallel Washington by permitting 
a supermajority override. 
 Here, as with the case of three-reading requirements, I shall suggest that the 
absence of a similar provision from the federal constitution is cause for regret. The point 
of such provisions is straightforward. Timing limitations, whether of the forwards or 
backwards variety, protect the end of the legislative session from overcrowding, and with 
good reason. First, the multiple delays built into the structure of legislative procedure 
routinely creates a press of business at the end of the legislative session. By creating a 
period in which no new business can be added while old business is being processed, 
timing limitations help to minimize the costs of legislatures’ complex internal structure. 
Second, timing limitations reduce the likelihood that ill-considered or technically 
maladroit measures will pass during the end-of-session flurry, measures that might not 
obtain majority approval in calmer moments. Finally, in many states timing provisions 
were enacted as progressive reforms in response to episodes in which legislatures 
finished the session with a flurry of quasi-corrupt, or simply corrupt, spending legislation 
or special bills. The massive volume of business that always marks the end of legislative 
sessions increases the costs to other legislators and outside groups of monitoring and 
blocking such legislation; timing limitations create a buffer period in which public 
outrage may be turned against sitting legislators, permitting the most inefficient 
legislation to be repealed or reversed in the current session. Without timing limitations, 
on the other hand, legislators may hope to weather the political storm after the legislature 
has recessed and public attention has receded. 
To be sure, some of the relevant problems might be dampened by more precisely-
targeted provisions, such as constitutional restrictions on special-interest legislation. But 
                                                 
191 Elster, Arguing and Bargaining, supra note 94 makes a similar point about the Origination Clause. 
192 Wash. Const., art. II, § 36. 
193 Mo. Const., art. III, § 25. 
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the sponginess of such provisions, resulting from the notorious difficulty of identifying 
special-interest measures or even understanding the “public interest” at a conceptual 
level, means that a quantified rule such as a timing restriction is easier to enforce, and 
thus a valuable prophylactic device. Another stock objection to timing restrictions is the 
possibility of circumvention. In most states the relevant provisions is held not to bar 
amendments offered outside the permissible window for introduction, so that legislatures 
have sometimes introduced “skeleton” bills within the window and then tacked on 
sweeping amendments. But this, like the gambit of thoroughgoing amendments that the 
Senate occasionally uses to circumvent the Origination Clause, presents an ordinary 
form-and-substance problem. Officials charged with enforcing constitutional rules must 
constantly resolve similar questions; the threat of circumvention is rarely thought such an 
insuperable problem as to condemn the underlying rules entirely. Note that this point 
does not assume that judges are the ones enforcing the provision, so the point holds even 
in jurisdictions where the enrolled bill rule prevents judges from examining the timing of 
the bill’s introduction to check compliance with the restriction. Legislatures vigorously 
enforce many such restrictions, as we also saw in the Origination Clause setting; in 
general, it is a mistake to assume that constitutional prohibitions are somehow unreal 
unless backed up by judicial review, although it is a mistake that routinely seduces court-
centered constitutional lawyers. 
 In both the case of three-reading requirements and the case of timing restrictions, 
then, other jurisdictions have pioneered innovations in the constitutional law of 
congressional procedure that the federal Constitution would do well to imitate. That it has 
not done so is a special case of a more general problem: the higher cost of federal 
constitutional amendment works for both good and, in this case, ill, by creating a status 
quo bias that blocks both misguided experiments and valuable innovations. But it is not 
far-fetched to imagine that a political coalition might arise to support procedural 
requirements whose substantive political valence is, as in these cases, uncertain ex ante; 
many constitutional amendments, especially in the modern era, have just this procedural 
and structural character.194 So it is a plausible recommendation, or aspiration, that the 
constitutional law of congressional procedure should be supplemented in these respects. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 In the framers’ view, and in ours, the constitutional law of congressional 
procedure should accomplish a range of laudable aims. The relevant rules should promote 
well-informed, and cognitively undistorted legislative deliberation; ameliorate the 
principal-agent problems inherent in legislative representation; and make technically 
efficient use of the legislature’s resources, especially its compressed agenda space. 
Unfortunately these aims cannot all be simultaneously attained in full, as the framers 
were well aware. The Constitution’s eventual choices aimed to optimize the inevitable 
tradeoffs between and among these goods, alleviating legislative pathologies without 
cramping the self-governance of future legislative institutions. Yet there is no guarantee 
that the framers’ instrumental choices were successful ones, and I have refused to take it 
                                                 
194 See, e.g., Amdts. XX (addressing congressional terms and presidential succession), XXII (addressing 
presidential term limits), XXV (addressing presidential succession), XXVII (addressing legislative 
compensation). 
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on faith that they were. Centuries of subsequent experimentation and innovation in 
Congress and in state and foreign constitutions provide rich resources with which to 
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